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ARTICLES
THE CORRESPONDENCE OF CONTRACT AND PROMISE
Jody S. Kraus*
Correspondence accounts of the relationship between contract and promise hold either that contract law is justified to the extent it enforces a corresponding moral responsibility for a promise or unjustified to the extent it
undermines promissory morality by refusing to enforce a corresponding moral
responsibility for a promise. In this Article, I claim that contract scholars
have mistakenly presumed that they can assess the correspondence between
contract and promise without first providing a theory of self-imposed moral
responsibility that explains and justifies the promise principle. I argue that
any plausible theory of self-imposed moral responsibility is inconsistent with a
strong correspondence account, which would impose legal liability for all
promises, including promises intended not to be legally enforceable. To illustrate the dependence of correspondence accounts of contract law on a theory of
self-imposed moral responsibility, I demonstrate how a “personal sovereignty”
account of individual autonomy—one of the most familiar and intuitive
theories of self-imposed moral responsibility—explains how and why, contrary to existing correspondence theories, promissory responsibility corresponds
to the objective theory of intent. I then use the personal sovereignty account to
demonstrate why a theory of self-imposed moral responsibility is necessary to
determine whether contract remedies correspond to the remedial moral rights
and duties that attach to violations of promissory responsibilities. I argue
that the personal sovereignty account explains how and why promissory morality corresponds to most remedial contract doctrines, including the bar
against mandatory punitive damages, the foreseeability limitation on consequential damages, the mitigation doctrine, and expectation damages, the
paradigm example of a contract doctrine alleged to conflict with promissory
morality. Finally, I argue that personal sovereignty also explains and justifies the doctrines of consideration and promissory estoppel. Correspondence
theorists, therefore, can defend their critiques of contract law only by rejecting
the personal sovereignty theory of self-imposed moral responsibility, defending
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an alternative theory, and explaining why any resulting divergence between
contract law and its requirements is objectionable. Absent such a theory,
correspondence accounts of contract law have no foundation.
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INTRODUCTION
A natural account of the relationship between contract and promise
holds that legal liability in contract enforces a corresponding moral responsibility for a promise. For some time, this “correspondence” account
has framed attempts to explain and evaluate contract law. For example,
Charles Fried’s classic contract as promise thesis argues that contract law
is justified because it enforces promises.1 For Fried, liberal individualism
requires the state to vindicate the individual right to undertake legally
binding, self-imposed obligations, and contract law serves that purpose.2
More recently, scholars have raised a moral objection to contract law because of its alleged divergence from promise.3 This objection holds that
1. Charles Fried, Contract as Promise 1 (1981) [hereinafter Fried, Contract as
Promise] (“The promise principle, which in this book I argue is the moral basis of contract
law, is that principle by which persons may impose on themselves obligations where none
existed before.”); id. at 40 (stating thesis that contract is “grounded in the primitive moral
institution of promising”).
2. “The regime of contract law, which respects the dispositions individuals make of
their rights, carries to its natural conclusion the liberal premise that individuals have
rights. And the will theory of contract, which sees contractual obligations as essentially selfimposed, is a fair implication of liberal individualism.” Id. at 2.
3. See, e.g., Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Toward a Liberal Theory of
Contract 89–115 (2003) (using correspondence account to raise moral objection to
alleged divergence, but offering response to defeat objection); Seana Shiffrin, The
Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708 (2007) [hereinafter Shiffrin,
Divergence]. Shiffrin’s critique has sparked a debate among legal scholars and
philosophers. For responses to Shiffrin’s article, see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Objectivity and
Subjectivity in Contract Law: A Copernican Response to Professor Shiffrin, 21 Can. J.L. &
Jurisprudence 399 (2008); Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev.
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when A promises B to do X, contract law should enforce A’s obligation by
making him do X because that is precisely the moral obligation A undertook by promising to do X.4 The default remedy for breach of contract,
however, is expectation damages, not specific performance.5 The moral
objection thus faults contract law for failing to impose a legal duty on
breachers that corresponds to their moral duty. To make matters worse,
economic analysts have defended the efficient breach hypothesis,6 which
801 (2008) [hereinafter Pratt, Contract: Not Promise]; Charles Fried, The Convergence of
Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. F. 1 (2007), at http://www.harvardlawreview.org/
forum/issues/120/jan07/cfried.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review); Barbara H.
Fried, What’s Morality Got to Do with It?, 120 Harv. L. Rev. F. 53 (2007), at http://
www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/jan07/bfried.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Liam Murphy, Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. F. 10 (2007), at http:/
/www.harvardlawreview.org/forum/issues/120/jan07/lmurphy.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Brian H. Bix, Contract Rights and Remedies, and the
Divergence Between Law and Morality, 21 Ratio Juris 194–95 (2008) (claiming that wide
jurisdictional variance of contract remedies establishes “central difference between
promises in morality and enforceable agreements in law”).
4. Notably, Fried himself does not take exception to the expectation damage default
remedy, instead maintaining that “[i]f I make a promise to you, I should do as I promise;
and if I fail to keep my promise, it is fair that I should be made to hand over the equivalent
of the promised performance.” Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 17. Other
scholars disagree, arguing that Fried should endorse expectancy only if specific
performance is not possible. See, e.g., Kimel, supra note 3, at 95–96; Peter Benson, The
Idea of a Public Basis of Justification for Contract, 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 273, 291–93
(1995); Thomas M. Scanlon, Promises and Contracts, in The Theory of Contract Law: New
Essays 86, 92 (Peter Benson ed., 2001).
5. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344(a) & cmt. a (1981) (“Ordinarily,
when a court concludes that there has been a breach of contract, it enforces the broken
promise by protecting the expectation that the injured party had when he made the
contract. . . . The interest protected in this way is called the ‘expectation interest.’”); 3 E.
Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 12.1, at 149–50 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing
expectation damages as ordinary remedy for contract breach). Indeed, the expectation
damages default rule led Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to claim famously that the legal duty
to keep a contract is “a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and
nothing else.” Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 462
(1897) [hereinafter Holmes, Path of the Law]. Holmes also famously claimed that “[t]he
only universal consequence of a legally binding promise is, that the law makes the
promisor pay damages if the promised event does not come to pass.” Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 301 (Little Brown 1963) (1881). If Holmes is right, then
contract law converts the promissory obligation to do X into the contractual duty to do X
or pay damages.
6. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule 245–64
(1991) (discussing views of Holmes and Posner on efficient breach, and analyzing theory
from economic and normative perspectives); W. David Slawson, Binding Promises 122
(1996); John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. Legal
Stud. 277, 291 (1972) (noting that “[c]ompletion of a contract according to its terms is
often not optimal” and hypothesizing that at times “simplicity and certainty are more
valuable than allocative perfection” (emphasis omitted)); Robert L. Birmingham, Breach
of Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 273, 284–85
(1969) (arguing it would be socially desirable to encourage “[r]epudiation of
obligations . . . where the promisor is able to profit from his default” after paying
expectation damages); Richard R.W. Brooks, The Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116
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justifies expectation damages on the ground that it facilitates breach
when paying damages instead will make promisors better off. To many,
the efficient breach hypothesis suggests that expectation damages actually encourage and thereby endorse breach. So understood, the objection to the expectation damages rule is not merely that it falls short of
enforcing the promisor’s corresponding moral duty, but that it affirmatively undermines it. In light of the perceived divergence between promissory morality and many other contract doctrines in addition to expectation damages,7 Seana Shiffrin has recently argued that contract law not
only fails to hold moral agents legally accountable for their promissory
obligations, but erodes the social foundations of moral agency itself.8
Correspondence theorists thus begin by determining whether the legal rights and duties recognized by contract correspond to the moral
rights and responsibilities created by promise. By demonstrating their
Yale L.J. 568, 570–73 (2006) (discussing benefits of allocative efficiency promoted by
efficient breach theory, and suggesting modified “efficient performance” theory); Richard
Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 629, 636–38 (1988) [hereinafter Craswell, Contract Remedies] (discussing efficient
breach in light of goal of contract damages—to give compensation); Daniel Friedmann,
The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 4 (1989) (arguing that “[t]he essence of
the theory is ‘efficiency’” and pointing out that “[i]t is not explained why opportunistic
breaches should be discouraged even if they are efficient”); Daniel Friedmann, The
Performance Interest in Contract Damages, 111 L.Q. Rev. 628, 628, 632 (1995) (pointing
out that idea of restitution interest has become widespread in American legal discourse);
Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 Va. L. Rev. 947, 947–50
(1982) (noting that “[t]he doctrine of efficient breach is enshrined in the bible of law and
economics” and suggesting ways to strengthen it). For a response to Brooks, see Jody S.
Kraus, A Critique of the Efficient Performance Hypothesis, 116 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 423
(2007), at http://www.thepocketpart.org/2007/07/23/kraus.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) (arguing that Brooks’s theory is supported by unmotivated moral
objections, and is likely to be less efficient than expectation damages). For Brooks’s
response, see Richard R.W. Brooks, What Efficiency Demands: The Efficient Performance
Hypothesis Defended, 117 Yale L.J. Pocket Part 14 (2007), at http://www.
thepocketpart.org/2007/07/24/brooks.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
7. These include the bar on punitive damages, the liquidated damages doctrine, the
mitigation doctrine, the foreseeability doctrine governing consequential damages, the
consideration doctrine, and promissory estoppel. See infra Part II (analyzing claims of
perceived divergence with respect to these doctrines).
8. For Shiffrin, contract law violates three requirements of moral agency:
First, what legal rules directly require agents to do or to refrain from doing
should not, as a general matter, be inconsistent with leading a life of at least
minimal moral virtue. . . .
Second, the law and its rationale should be transparent and accessible to the
moral agent. Moreover, their acceptance by the agent should be compatible with
her developing and maintaining moral virtue. . . .
Third, the culture and practices facilitated by law should be compatible with
a culture that supports morally virtuous character. Even supposing that law is not
responsible for and should not aim to enforce virtuous character and
interpersonal moral norms, the legal system should not be incompatible with or
present serious obstacles to leading a decent moral life.
Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 718–19.
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correspondence, Fried purports to justify contract law.9 By demonstrating their divergence, critics purport to ground a moral objection to the
contract doctrines responsible for the divergence. Both, however, mistakenly presume that it is possible to assess the correspondence of contract
and promise without first specifying a foundational normative theory of
promissory morality. As a result, Fried unjustifiably concludes that the
objective theory of intent creates contractual rights and duties that do not
correspond to, and therefore cannot be justified by, promissory rights
and responsibilities.10 The critics unjustifiably conclude that the expectation damages doctrine, among others, creates contractual rights and duties that do not correspond to, and in fact undermine, promissory rights
and responsibilities. In this Article, I argue that correspondence accounts of contract law cannot proceed without first identifying the theory
of self-imposed moral responsibility on which they take the practice of
promise to rest. By identifying the foundational normative commitments
9. Fried finds correspondence between contract and promise, however, only by
literally defining contract as the body of law that enforces promises. For Fried, any alleged
divergence between a contract doctrine and promise requires reclassification of that
doctrine under noncontract law, even if the doctrine is widely regarded as a core
component of contract law. For example, Fried jettisons the doctrine of consideration
entirely. See, e.g., Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 28–39 (“My conclusion
is . . . that the doctrine of consideration offers no coherent alternative basis for the force of
contracts, while still treating promise as necessary to it.”). Fried also reclassifies as part of
tort law any contractual liability predicated on objective intention or reliance:
Another of the classical law’s evasions of the inevitability of using noncontractual
principles to resolve failures of agreement is recourse to the so-called objective
standard of interpretation. In the face of a claim of divergent intentions, the
court imagines that it is respecting the will of the parties by asking what somebody
else, say the ordinary person, would have intended by such words of agreement.
This . . . palpably involves imposing an external standard on the parties. . . . [This
approach has] its origin in nonpromissory standards of justice . . . .
Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 61.
At first glance the distinction between promissory obligation and obligation based
on reliance may seem too thin to notice, but indeed large theoretical and
practical matters turn on that distinction. To enforce a promise as such is to
make a defendant render a performance (or its money equivalent) just because
he has promised that very thing. The reliance view, by contrast, focuses on an
injury suffered by the plaintiff and asks if the defendant is somehow sufficiently
responsible for that injury that he should be made to pay compensation.
Id. at 4; see also Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in The Oxford Handbook of
Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law 687, 703–32 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) [hereinafter Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law] (“Fried’s principal motivation . . . is
to support his normative claim that contract law is morally justified because it legally
enforces the moral obligation to keep promises.”).
10. Fried concedes that contract law imposes liability for merely objective promises.
See Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 61 (citing Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The
Common Law 230 (M. Howe ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1963) (1881); 1 Samuel Williston, A
Treatise on the Law of Contract § 94, at 339 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., Mt. Kisco 1957)
(1936)) (asserting that contractual intent is objective). But he claims that because liability
based solely on objective intent is grounded on nonpromissory principles, it is not genuinely
contractual. See infra note 36.
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that justify the practice of promising, the theory of self-imposed moral
responsibility clarifies the conditions under which the legal enforcement
of promises is morally permissible and explains how the content of promissory rights and responsibilities is determined. To demonstrate how
such a theory affects the assessment of the correspondence between contract and promise, I consider how the conception of individual autonomy
that Joel Feinberg has called “personal sovereignty” could form the core
of an intuitive theory of self-imposed responsibility from which promissory morality can be derived.11
Personal sovereignty holds that “respect for a person’s autonomy is
respect for his unfettered voluntary choice as the sole rightful determinant of his actions except where the interests of others need protection
from him.”12 In Rawlsian terms, personal sovereignty recognizes the fundamental right of individuals to choose, revise, and pursue their own system of ends.13 Personal sovereignty provides a single normative source
for both moral “duties,” which arise out of moral agency alone, and moral
“obligations,” which arise solely out of the voluntary undertaking of a
moral agent.14 By affirming the fundamental right of individuals to determine their own actions, personal sovereignty necessarily affirms the
11. Feinberg takes the metaphor seriously: “The politically independent state is said
to be sovereign over its own territory. Personal autonomy similarly involves the idea of
having a domain or territory in which the self is sovereign.” 3 Joel Feinberg, The Moral
Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to Self 52 (1986). Feinberg invokes the personal
sovereignty conception of autonomy as a normative basis for limiting the exercise of
political coercion, rather than as an independent principle of morality. Yet if personal
sovereignty provides a normatively compelling ground for limiting political coercion, it
must also constitute a fundamental value in any plausible overall theory of morality. See
generally id. at 52–97.
12. Id. at 68 (emphasis omitted). Similarly, Feinberg states that “[t]he kernel of the
idea of autonomy is the right to make choices and decisions . . . . [T]he most basic
autonomy-right is the right to decide how one is to live one’s life.” Id. at 54. As Joseph Raz
describes it:
The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people should
make their own lives. The autonomous person is a (part) author of his own life.
The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some
degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout
their lives. . . . Autonomy is an ideal of self-creation.
Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom 369–70 (1986) [hereinafter Raz, Morality of
Freedom]. The personal sovereignty conception of autonomy itself is neutral on the
question of how morality determines what moral agents ought to do, all things considered.
Of course, there is a rich body of literature exploring competing conceptions of personal
autonomy and debating their role in moral theory. See, e.g., Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled
Virtue 117–48 (2003).
13. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism 19 (1993) (arguing that individuals have
capacity for conception of the good, which is capacity “to form, to revise, and rationally
pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage or good”). Similarly, Rawls famously held
that moral persons properly “regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid
claims.” Id. at 32.
14. See infra notes 23–26 (discussing distinction between moral duty and moral
obligation).
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correlative moral duties that prohibit violation of that right—the morality
of personal freedom entails the morality of personal responsibility. But
personal sovereignty also recognizes the fundamental right of individuals
not only to choose their system of ends but also to choose how to pursue
those ends. Promising constitutes a particularly valuable means for pursuing ends. By promising, an individual credibly communicates to the
promisee that he has imposed a moral responsibility on himself, which
provides him with a distinctive and powerful practical reason for doing
the promised act. The promisee’s knowledge of the promise, in turn,
changes her practical reasoning by providing her with assurance of the
promised performance. Individuals can use the ability to provide such
assurance to induce promisees to assist them in realizing their ends.15
The personal sovereignty conception of autonomy does not entail a comprehensive morality that requires the maximization of autonomy generally and certainly does not require that the content of moral responsibilities and liberties be determined by calculating the extent to which
conduct conduces to an autonomous life. But if morality itself can provide individuals a valuable means of pursuing their ends simply by recognizing the individual moral power to undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities, a moral theory committed to personal sovereignty as a
fundamental moral value would have no grounds for refusing to recognize such a power. Personal sovereignty therefore counts the moral capacity to undertake self-imposed moral responsibilities as a basic individual liberty. By affirming the fundamental right of individuals to choose
how to pursue their desired ends, personal sovereignty necessarily affirms
the category of moral responsibility that obligation describes. The moral
power to make—and thus the moral obligation to keep—a promise is
therefore an axiom of personal sovereignty. I use the personal sovereignty account to illustrate how a theory of self-imposed moral responsibility informs the assessment of the correspondence between contract
and promise.
In Part I, I analyze the structure of correspondence accounts of contract law and explain why a theory of self-imposed responsibility is necessary to determine the correspondence between contractual liability and
promissory responsibility. Section A demonstrates how such a theory corrects the misleading impression, which Fried’s strong correspondence account might give, that any contractual duty that enforces a corresponding
promissory obligation is thereby justified.16 I argue that neither the personal sovereignty account, nor any other plausible theory of self-imposed
moral responsibility, is consistent with the legal enforcement of all
promises, including promises intended not to be legally enforceable. Be15. These ends can be self-regarding or other-regarding. See infra note 35 and
accompanying text.
16. Note that despite Fried’s insistence that contract law is justified because it
enforces promissory obligations, he nevertheless concedes that contract law cannot
justifiably enforce promises intended not to be legally enforceable. See infra note 21.
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cause such enforcement vitiates, rather than vindicates, the promisor’s
intent, it cannot be justified under the rubric of self-imposed moral responsibility. In Section B, I reject Fried’s claim that subjective intent is
required to create a promise and determine its content. I argue instead
that a promissory morality derived from the personal sovereignty account
predicates promissory responsibility on the objective intent of promisors.
On this account, even contractual duties arising from objective intent
alone enforce corresponding promissory obligations. In Section C, I explain why the correspondence between contractual remedies for breach
and promissory morality cannot be assessed without first understanding
how the theory of self-imposed moral responsibility affects the remedial
moral rights and duties created by the breach of a promise. By insisting
that the justification of contractual remedies turns on their correspondence to promissory morality, correspondence theories force the question of how morality determines the content of remedial moral rights and
duties generally. Yet, surprisingly, moral philosophy has given scant attention to the distinction, long familiar to legal theory, between liability
and remedy. Philosophers typically presume that breach of promise gives
rise to a remedial moral right of specific performance.17 But the content
of a remedial moral right cannot be determined by pure logic or brute
intuition alone. At a minimum, its content must be consistent with the
theory of moral responsibility grounding the right that was violated. Correspondence theories of contract therefore cannot proceed without first
specifying how the theory of self-imposed moral responsibility determines
the content of the remedial rights and duties recognized by promissory
morality.
In Part II, I argue that, on the personal sovereignty account, most of
the contract doctrines to which correspondence critics object in fact respect promissory morality, either by refusing to enforce promises intended not to be legally enforceable or by enforcing the corresponding
moral rights and duties to which breach of promise gives rise. Once the
full implications of the personal sovereignty view of promising are appreciated, most of the contract doctrines alleged to constitute morally objectionable divergences from promise are either not divergences at all—because they create legal rights and duties that correspond to promissory
moral rights and responsibilities—or are not morally objectionable. In
particular, I argue that the personal sovereignty account of promising is
17. See, e.g., Shiffrin’s discussion of contract law and morality:
If contract law ran parallel to morality, then contract law would—as the norms of
promises do—require that promisors keep their promises as opposed merely to
paying off their promises. The only difference is that it would require this as a
legal, and not merely a moral, matter.
. . . Contract law, however, diverges from morality in this respect. Contract
law’s dominant remedy is not specific performance but expectation damages.
Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 722–23. But see Kimel, supra note 3, at 89
(discussing “the apparent discord between the view that the core contractual right and
obligation are performance, and the remedial rights that are in practice recognised”).
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consistent with most of the contract doctrines to which correspondence
theorists object, including expectation damages, the paradigm example
of a contract doctrine alleged to conflict with the moral duties of a
promisor.
Finally, I conclude that the personal sovereignty account explains
how and why—contrary to existing correspondence critiques—contractual and promissory responsibility in fact largely correspond to one another. Of course, correspondence critics of contract law can reject the
personal sovereignty account of self-imposed moral responsibility. But to
provide an adequate defense of their critique, they must endorse an alternative theory of both self-imposed moral responsibility generally and
promissory morality in particular, and then explain why any resulting divergence between contract and promise is objectionable.
I. THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF CORRESPONDENCE ACCOUNTS
OF CONTRACT
It is natural to suppose that the justification of any particular area of
law turns, at least in part, on whether the legal rights and duties it recognizes correspond to individual moral rights and responsibilities. A normative legal theory that takes this “correspondence” approach requires a
two-stage analysis. First, it must explain why the correspondence or divergence of law and morality is relevant to the law’s justification. Fried
makes the strong claim that contract law is justified because it enforces
the corresponding rights and responsibilities of promissory morality.18
Shiffrin makes the weaker claim that contract law is unjustified because of
its divergence from promissory morality.19 Both correspondence accounts presuppose a normative political theory that explains why and
how the law’s correspondence to morality affects its justification. For present purposes, I assume that some normative political theory provides this
explanation.20 Second, a correspondence account must specify the nor18. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 8.
20. The most obvious political theory is legal moralism, which holds that the state is
justified in enforcing morality generally. See, e.g., Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of
Morals 12–13, 59 (1965) (arguing State may “legislate against immorality” to protect
against disintegration that occurs “when no common morality is observed” and “[t]he law
needs moral support and in return it must be prepared to support public morality”).
However, there are well-known objections to legal moralism. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Law,
Liberty, and Morality 50–52 (1962) (arguing Devlin wrongly assumes “that a society is
identical with its morality as that is at any given moment of its history, so that a change in
its morality is tantamount to the destruction of society”); Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and
the Enforcement of Morals, 75 Yale L.J. 986, 992 (1966) (“[Devlin’s] argument involves an
intellectual sleight of hand.”). Given these objections, strong correspondence accounts
might rely on other political theories that provide a deeper and more limited justification
for state enforcement of morality, such as corrective justice theories or Lockean/
libertarian theories. For a discussion of corrective justice theories, see generally Jules L.
Coleman, The Practice of Principle 3–63 (2001) (discussing “the relationship between tort
law and our redistributive institutions, and between the principles of corrective and
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mative foundation of the moral rights and responsibilities it claims correspond (or should correspond) to particular legal rights and duties. Correspondence accounts of contract, for example, must specify a theory of
promissory morality in order to determine whether the legal enforcement of promissory rights and responsibilities is morally permissible.
Even if legal enforcement of promissory rights and responsibilities is not
prohibited by normative political theory, such enforcement might nonetheless be incompatible with the moral theory that provides their foundation. In addition, the theory of promissory morality will determine
whether or not contract law enforces a promise when, under the objective theory of intent, it imposes contractual liability on an individual who
leads another reasonably to believe he has made a promise even though
he did not subjectively intend to make a promise. Finally, the theory of
promissory morality determines the structure and content of the remedial moral rights and duties to which violations of promises give rise.
Specification of a theory of promissory morality is therefore a prerequisite for assessing the correspondence between the remedial legal rights
and duties to which breach of contract gives rise and the remedial moral
rights and duties to which promise breaking gives rise.
In this Part, I argue that correspondence accounts of contract are
necessarily premised on a theory of the normative foundation of the
moral rights and responsibilities to which they claim contract law does or
should correspond. Therefore, any account that claims to justify or criticize contract law because of its alleged correspondence to, or divergence
from, promissory morality must at least identify the theory of promissory
morality on which it rests. A complete correspondence account must also
defend that theory. Thus, correspondence accounts of contract law that
do not identify the theory of promissory morality on which their account
depends are fundamentally incomplete and undefended. To illustrate
the role that a theory of promissory morality plays in completing and defending correspondence accounts of contract law, I argue in Section A
that a commitment to the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy
as the foundation of promissory morality is incompatible with a strong
correspondence account, which claims that all promises should be legally
enforceable.21 In Section B, I argue that the personal sovereignty acdistributive justice”). For a discussion of Lockean/libertarian theory, see generally A. John
Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy 5 (1993) (discussing Locke’s idea of “political
relationship . . . [as] a particular kind of moral relationship among free persons, based in
consent and consisting of a certain mutuality of rights and obligations”); A. John Simmons,
Political Philosophy 89–94 (2008) (explaining how Robert Nozick’s libertarian theory
builds on John Locke’s political theory).
21. Fried’s theory has the structure of a strong correspondence theory because he
takes contract law to be justified on the grounds that it enforces promises. By that
reasoning, contract law should enforce even promises intended not to be legally
enforceable. But in a footnote, Fried explicitly concedes that the law should not enforce a
promise that is intended not to be legally enforceable. Fried, Contract as Promise, supra
note 1, at 38 n.* (“[G]iven the consensual basis of contract as promise, the parties should
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count of promissory morality explains why contract law should be understood to be enforcing promises even when it holds individuals contractually bound by promises they did not subjectively intend to make.
Personal sovereignty, therefore, justifies the objective theory of intent on
the ground that it enforces promissory morality. In Section C, I argue
that the personal sovereignty account of promissory morality explains
why promisors have control not only over the number and content of the
promises they make, but also the content of the remedial moral rights
and duties to which breach of their promise gives rise.
A. Promissory Morality and the Intent Not to Be Legally Bound
Correspondence accounts have been most successful in tort and
criminal law. It is natural to conceive of these areas as legal regimes that
enforce the moral responsibilities of individuals not to harm others negligently or intentionally. A strong correspondence account, for example,
claims that the legal duties created by tort and criminal law are justified
by virtue of their correspondence to the duties morality independently
imposes on every moral agent.22 Strong correspondence accounts of conin principle be free to exclude legal enforcement so long as this is not a fraudulent device to
trap the unwary.”). Fried neither acknowledges the apparent inconsistency of his position
nor explains the grounds for carving out this exception to his strong correspondence
account.
22. Strong correspondence accounts presuppose that the existence and content of
the moral duties enforced by tort and criminal law necessarily are determined, as a
conceptual matter, prior to the legal liability that attached to them. In this respect, these
correspondence views seem to have a structure that resembles the well-known
correspondence theories of truth. See, e.g., George Edward Moore, Some Main Problems
of Philosophy 270–87 (1953) (arguing that beliefs are true when and only when they
“correspond to a fact”); Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy 128–29 (Oxford
Univ. Press 1959) (1912) (arguing that correspondence between beliefs and objects of
those beliefs “ensures truth, and its absence entails falsehood”). For a discussion of
correspondence theories of truth, see generally Marian David, The Correspondence
Theory of Truth, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2002),
at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/#1 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). However, some philosophers explicitly deny that any theory that justifies
legal liability on the ground that it enforces moral duties must treat those moral duties as
conceptually determined prior to the attachment of legal liability. Although Jules
Coleman’s corrective justice account of tort law claims that tort law can be explained and
justified on the ground that it enforces a certain class of moral duties, he denies that the
full content of those duties is determined, as a conceptual matter, before legal liability
attaches to them. Instead, he argues that tort law itself necessarily assigns additional
content to the moral duties it enforces in the course of their adjudication. For Coleman’s
view, see Coleman, supra note 20, at 32 (arguing that “corrective justice is an account of
the second-order duty of repair” incurred when someone has wronged another to whom
he owes duty of care, but in itself does not provide full account of all first-order duties
protected in tort law). For my argument against Coleman’s view, see Jody S. Kraus,
Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of
Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 Va. L. Rev. 287, 313–20 (2007) (arguing that
Coleman’s corrective justice theory “leaves the central concepts of tort law largely
indeterminate”).
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tract law have the same initial appeal as correspondence accounts of tort
and criminal law. A strong correspondence account claims that contract
law is justified because it enforces the moral responsibility to keep one’s
promises.23 The structural similarity of these two correspondence accounts suggests that they should stand or fall together. But they do not.
The moral responsibilities that strong correspondence accounts claim
tort and criminal law enforce have a profoundly different normative
structure than the moral responsibilities that strong correspondence theories claim contract law enforces: Tort and criminal law enforce moral
duties, but contract law enforces promises, which create moral obligations,
not duties.
Moral duties designate those responsibilities to which morality subjects individuals solely by virtue of their status as moral agents alone,
while moral obligations designate those responsibilities to which morality
subjects moral agents only if they have voluntarily chosen to undertake
them.24 Unlike moral duties, moral obligations are self-imposed.25 Since
23. For example, Fried’s contract as promise view holds that contract law can be
explained and justified on the ground that it legally enforces individual moral
responsibilities. In particular, his view holds that contract law enforces the moral
obligation to keep a promise, which itself is grounded in respect for individual autonomy.
Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 16 (“The obligation to keep a promise is
grounded . . . in respect for individual autonomy and in trust.”). Fried argues that contract
law, by definition, enforces promises. He therefore concludes that any doctrine that fails
to enforce a promise, or imposes nonpromissory liability, is either erroneous law or
noncontract law. See Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, supra note 9, at 706 (“Fried’s
claim is that all and only those cases decided on the basis of a doctrine supportable by the
promise principle qualify as genuine contracts cases. If they can’t be supported by the
promise principle, they are either defensible as non-contract cases, or indefensible because
incoherent.”); infra notes 30, 36–37 and accompanying text.
24. See H.L.A. Hart, Legal and Moral Obligation, in Essays in Moral Philosophy 82,
101–03 (A.I. Melden ed., 1958) (stating obligations are “deliberately created” and moral
duties “are not conceived of as truly created by the deliberate choice of the individual”);
see also A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations 11–16 (1979) (stating
that term duty is used “independent of any institutional setting or special role” and that
“[a]n obligation is a moral requirement generated by the performance of some voluntary
act (or omission)”); R.B. Brandt, The Concepts of Obligation and Duty, 73 Mind 374, 375
(1964) (“[According to Hart, w]hat distinguishes obligations from duties is that ‘they may
be voluntarily incurred or created’ (whereas duties arise from position, status, role), and
that ‘they are owed to special persons (who have rights).’”).
25. More generally, moral duties provide “content-dependent” reasons for action,
while obligations provide “content-independent” reasons for action. The distinction
originates with H.L.A. Hart, who explains that “content-independence” is a term used
to differentiate the notion of obligation from the general notion of what morally
‘ought’ to be done. Content-independence of commands lies in the fact that a
commander may issue many different commands to the same or to different
people and the actions commanded may have nothing in common, yet in the case
of all of them the commander intends his expressions of intention to be taken as
a reason for doing them. It is therefore intended to function as a reason
independently of the nature or character of the actions to be done. In this of
course it differs strikingly from the standard paradigmatic cases of reasons for
action where between the reason and the action there is a connection of content:
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promises serve as a mechanism for voluntarily undertaking a moral responsibility, promises create moral obligations rather than duties. The
justification for legal enforcement that correspondence accounts offer is
necessarily sensitive to this difference in kind between moral
responsibilities.
Deontic moral theories often account for the significance of the distinction between duties and obligations by explaining the role each plays
in vindicating individual autonomy. However, although both moral duties and obligations can be grounded on respect for individual autonomy,
each accords individual volition a different role in explaining the origins
of the kind of moral responsibility it describes. The responsibility described by moral duty is limited in application to the voluntary actions of
moral agents. In the domain of moral duty, voluntariness serves to limit
the range of actions over which individuals can be held morally accountable. Importantly, although individuals are not morally responsible for involuntary conduct, intention (beyond that required for voluntariness)
plays no role in explaining the origin of moral duties themselves. The
responsibility described by moral obligation is also limited to voluntary
actions, but it further requires that those actions be taken with the additional and distinct intention to incur a moral responsibility that individuals are otherwise free to avoid.26 In the domain of moral obligation,
then, intention serves not only to limit the range of actions over which
individuals can be held morally accountable, but also as the sole source of
purely self-originating moral responsibility. Thus, for deontic moral theories with a foundational commitment to the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy, duties provide a “protective framework” for the exercise of personal sovereignty in action (by proscribing conduct that
infringes individual liberty), while obligations result from the exercise of
personal sovereignty for the purpose of creating new moral relationships.
there the reason may be some valued or desired consequence to which the action
is a means, . . . or it may be some circumstance given which the action functions
as a means to such a desired consequence (my reason for shutting the window
was that I felt cold).
H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 254–55 (1982) [hereinafter Hart, Essays on Bentham]; see
also Leslie Green, The Authority of the State 41–51 (1988) (“When we keep promises, . . .
we often feel that the force of reasons on which we act does not wholly depend on the
content of the specific promise . . . which was made.”); Raz, Morality of Freedom, supra
note 12, at 35 (“A reason is content-independent if there is no direct connection between
the reason and the action for which it is a reason.”).
26. See, e.g., Michael Pratt, Promises, Contracts and Voluntary Obligations, 26 Law &
Phil. 531, 533 (2007) (“An obligation is voluntary in the voluntarist sense if and only if it
rests for its validity on the intention of the obligor to acquire it, which intention counts as a
positive reason in favor of its imposition.”); Joseph Raz, Promises and Obligations, in Law,
Morality and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart 210, 218 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz
eds., 1977) (“Promises are voluntary obligations not because promising is an intentional
action, but because it is the communication of an intention to undertake an
obligation . . . . To promise is, on this conception, to communicate an intention to
undertake by the very act of communication an obligation to perform a certain action.”).
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The special role played by intention in accounting for the normative
significance of the category of moral obligation raises an objection to
strong correspondence accounts of contract. Such accounts claim that
the legal enforcement of promises is justified on the ground that it holds
individuals to the moral obligations they create by promising. But what if
an individual wants to make a promise without incurring legal liability for
the resulting promissory obligation? A strong correspondence account of
contract law must insist that legal enforcement is morally justified even
for promissory obligations created by promisors who intend not to incur
legal liability when they make a promise.27 On this view, individuals are
free to undertake moral obligations as they see fit, but they are not similarly free to decide whether to subject themselves to legal liability for
those moral obligations. This result would be unremarkable if correspondence accounts of contract had the same justificatory logic as correspondence accounts of tort and criminal law. After all, the latter are hardly
embarrassed by the fact that individuals cannot avoid tort or criminal liability by the simple expedient of committing otherwise tortious or criminal acts with the intent not to incur legal liability for them. But as we
have seen, the moral responsibilities enforced by tort and criminal law
are duties, whose morally binding force therefore does not derive from
an intention to be bound by them. Moral duties apply to an individual by
virtue of his status as a moral agent, not by virtue of his intention to subject himself to them.
It is unsurprising, then, that an individual’s intention not to be subject to a moral duty has no effect on whether the duty applies to him.
Moral duties are not self-imposed. Thus, no puzzle arises for a correspondence account that justifies a legal duty on the ground that it enforces a
moral duty, even when the individual subjected to that duty intends not
to be held legally accountable for violating it. Just as his intent plays no
role in explaining why he is morally subject to that duty, it plays no role in
explaining why he is legally liable for violating it. Correspondence accounts of tort and criminal law, then, can simply rely on the same reasons
that explain why moral duties apply to individuals—even if they intend
not to be bound by them—to explain why the corresponding legal duties
likewise apply even to individuals who intend not to be bound by them.
The whole point of correspondence accounts is to ground legal liability,
at least in part, on the reasons that explain the underlying moral responsibilities they enforce.
However, as we have also seen, moral obligations are self-imposed.
They do not apply to an individual whether or not he has an intention to
incur them. Indeed, moral obligations can be incurred only by individuals who have precisely such an intention. The category of moral obligation exists for the sole purpose of enabling individuals voluntarily to subject themselves to moral responsibilities they are otherwise free to avoid.
27. But see supra note 21.
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So when a correspondence account of contract insists on imposing legal
liability for a promissory obligation to which the promisor intends not to
be legally bound, it conflicts with any deontic theory that explains the
source of the moral responsibility that the correspondence account
would legally enforce. Such theories ground the moral responsibility in
the individual will of the promisor. On the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy, promisors are held morally accountable for their
promises out of respect for their right to choose to undertake moral commitments as they see fit.28 When a correspondence account insists on
enforcing a promise made by a promisor who intended it not to be legally
binding, it paradoxically purports to justify a legal obligation on the
ground that it enforces a moral responsibility derived entirely from the
individual’s free will, even though legally enforcing that obligation violates the will of the very same individual whose autonomy the moral obligation is supposed to vindicate. Strong correspondence accounts of contract commit no logical error by legally enforcing promises that were
made with the intent that they not be given legal effect. But they are
deeply inconsistent with the fundamental moral value of personal sovereignty that both underwrites the moral responsibilities they enforce and
28. Indeed, philosophers have long held that obligations are distinguished from
duties by virtue of content-independence. Their content is provided only by the exercise
of the will of the individuals who incur them. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying
text. Of course, this is not to say that morality imposes no constraints on the content of
obligations that individuals may undertake. As H.L.A. Hart explained, moral duties limit
the range of content individuals are morally permitted to undertake:
Since we may promise to do very many different sorts of actions in no way related
to each other, the giving of a promise regarded as a reason for doing the action
promised has also the feature of content-independence. This is true even though
the range of possible actions which one may validly promise to do is not
unlimited and does not include grossly immoral actions or those intended to be
harmful to the promisee.
Hart, Essays on Bentham, supra note 25, at 255. Moreover, there may be some analytic
limits on the extent to which individuals can exercise control over their obligations. For
example, in order to undertake an obligation, an individual must subject himself to some
requirement. Thus, an illusory promise is no promise at all. Similarly, on P.F. Strawson’s
view of morality, a promisor might well lack the capacity to disclaim, so to speak, moral
liability for the reactive attitudes, such as resentment, to which immoral conduct
necessarily gives rise. See P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in Freedom and
Resentment and Other Essays 1, 6–13 (1974) (discussing circumstances surrounding
resentment). In addition, morality might impose substantive constraints on the content of
voluntary obligations that derive from its core principles. For example, a moral theory
grounded in the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy might not countenance the
voluntary forfeiture of powers or liberties that the theory treats as necessary conditions for
moral agency. Thus, it might be impossible, according to such a moral theory, to
voluntarily enslave oneself to another. The point, however, is that a moral theory
grounded in the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy must justify any limitation it
imposes on the content of the voluntary obligations moral agents can assume by arguing
from the principle of personal sovereignty—the same conception of autonomy that
explains the value of the category of moral obligation itself. My claim is that such theories
cannot, without risking internal inconsistency, refuse to respect a promisor’s intention not
to subject himself to legal liability for a promissory obligation he undertakes.
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provides the ultimate moral justification for the legal liability they
impose.
Strong correspondence accounts of contract, in fact, also face a logical barrier that prevents them from justifying the legal enforcement of all
promissory obligations. Promisors who do not wish to incur legal liability
can make their promises conditional on their promisees not seeking to
legally enforce them. Any attempt to legally enforce such a conditional
promise would have the effect of extinguishing the moral obligation.29
Contract law could refuse to respect this condition by insisting on legally
enforcing the promissory obligation as if it were not subject to the condition. But the resulting legal liability could not be grounded on the claim
that it enforces a corresponding promissory moral obligation. A correspondence account of contract could not coherently justify the legal enforcement of a promise that is made conditional on its not being legally
enforced.30
In sum, promissory obligations, like all moral obligations, are selfimposed. Moral obligations are distinguished from moral duties in order
to call attention to their distinctive source. Unlike moral duties, moral
29. Under the law of conditions in the First Restatement of Contracts, the promise
would be subject to a condition subsequent. A condition subsequent is a condition that
extinguishes a duty, which in this case would occur when the promisee seeks legal
enforcement of the promise and would thereby constitute a fact that extinguishes the
promissory duty (i.e., obligation). Restatement of Contracts § 250 (1932). Under the
Second Restatement, the promisee’s seeking to enforce the promise would constitute the
occurrence of an event that terminates the promisor’s duty (i.e., obligation). Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 230 (1981).
30. Note that individuals could also avoid legal liability for promissory moral
obligations by conditioning them on the nonexistence of a law making them legally
enforceable. However, this condition would disable individuals from subjecting themselves
to a promissory moral obligation that persists irrespective of the state of the law. If a law
making all promissory obligations enforceable is in effect at the time they make such a
conditional promise, the law will constitute an event whose occurrence prevents the
promissory obligation from taking moral effect. The promisor will not be bound by a
promissory obligation until the law ceases to exist. If the promise is made before a law
making all promissory obligations enforceable is in effect, then the promisor will be bound
by the promissory obligation unless and until such a law is in effect, at which time the
promissory obligation will no longer be binding on the promisor. While such a
conditional promise indeed does protect the promisor from the risk of being held legally
liable for the promise, it does so only by preventing him from subjecting himself to a
promissory obligation that necessarily binds him from the moment he makes the promise
until the moment he performs the promise. Thus, the possibility that individuals can
condition their promises on the nonexistence of laws making them legally enforceable
does not explain how strong correspondence accounts of contract can be reconciled with
the personal sovereignty foundation on which their justification ultimately must rely. If the
only way to avoid legal responsibility for one’s promises is to make them conditional on
their not being legally enforceable, then the freedom of individuals to bind themselves as
they see fit would be held hostage to the contingency of whether laws legally enforcing
those promises are in effect. Indeed, even the risk that such laws might come into effect
would contradict the personal sovereignty foundation of correspondence accounts of
contract by impermissibly constricting the range of promissory moral obligations
individuals can incur.
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obligations are created only by virtue of the exercise of the individual will
to create them—individuals become subject to moral obligations only by
intentionally undertaking them. As a result, correspondence accounts of
contract cannot justify the legal enforcement of all promissory obligations. The same commitment to respecting individual autonomy that explains and justifies the existence of the category of moral obligation itself
also explains why legal liability for promissory obligations cannot be imposed on individuals who intend not to incur legal liability for their
promises. In addition, correspondence accounts cannot justify the legal
enforcement of promises conditioned on the nonoccurrence of legal enforcement. Thus, it is not possible to determine the moral acceptability
of particular contract doctrines simply by assessing their correspondence
to or divergence from promissory rights and responsibilities. The moral
acceptability of such correspondence or divergence itself will turn entirely on the theory that provides the normative foundation for promissory morality.
B. Promissory Morality and Objective Intent
Correspondence accounts cannot justify the imposition of legal liability for all promissory obligations while endorsing deontic moral theories that derive those obligations from a foundational commitment to the
personal sovereignty conception of autonomy. A legal regime that refuses to honor the intent of individuals who wish to subject themselves to
legally unenforceable promissory obligations would be inconsistent with
that commitment. Whether or not a promissory obligation can be justifiably enforced, then, requires correspondence accounts to determine
whether the promisor intended his promise not to be given legal effect.
But the intention necessary to create promissory obligations, and to
determine their content and legal enforceability, can be understood objectively or subjectively. Contract law predicates contractual liability on
objective intent. The Second Restatement of Contracts defines a promise
as the “manifestation of intention to act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in understanding that a commitment has been made.”31 Contract law therefore can be properly understood as enforcing the moral obligation to keep a promise only if morality
also holds that objective intention is sufficient to create promissory
obligation.
Some deontologists, such as Fried, insist that a promissory obligation
can arise only from the subjective intention to make a promise.32 Fried’s
31. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 2(1).
32. See supra note 10 (discussing Fried’s view of objective theory of intent); see also
Fried’s discussion of presumed intent:
[I]n contract law there is a vaguely marked boundary between interpreting what
was agreed to and interpolating terms to which the parties in all probability would
have agreed but did not. The further courts are from the boundary between
interpretation and interpolation, the further they are from the moral basis of the
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claim is certainly grounded on a natural interpretation of deontological
moral theory.33 After all, an obligation is not self-imposed if the self does
not exercise its will to incur the obligation. Of course, Fried claims only
that subjective intent is a necessary, not sufficient, condition for making a
promise. Rather than making a genuine promise, a merely subjective
promisor, who subjectively intends to promise but fails to communicate
that intent to his promisee, performs the moral equivalent of a silent vow.
Both promises and silent vows provide the person who makes them with a
moral reason to perform them, but only promises can change the practical reasoning of others.34 As we have seen, the point of promising is to
provide individuals with the means for inducing others to assist them in
pursuing their ends. A promisor might seek to induce the promisee to
assist him in pursuing either his self-regarding ends, by conditioning a
future benefit on that assistance, or his other-regarding ends, by making
her an unconditional promise of a future gift to encourage her beneficial
reliance.35 In both cases, the objective is to affect the promisee’s behavior by changing her reasons for action. A promise serves this purpose
only if it gives the promisee reason to believe the promisor has underpromise principle and the more palpably are they imposing an agreement. . . . So
as we move further from actual intention the standard of presumed intention
tends to merge into the other substantive standards used to solve the problems
caused by a failure in the agreement.
Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 60–61.
33. There are, however, credible interpretations of classical deontological moral
theory, as well as contemporary deontological accounts of contract, that deny that
contractual liability must be traced to subjective intent. See, e.g., Peter Benson, Absolute
Right and the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and
Contemporary Contract Theory, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1077, 1098–99 (1989) (arguing
subjective intent may change as one changes one’s mind, and therefore should not impose
duty to perform); see also Scanlon, supra note 4, at 96 n.13 (leaving aside question of
whether individual can incur genuine promissory responsibility by unintentionally giving
another person “good reason to believe” he has made a promise); id. at 104 n.23
(contemplating idea that objective intent might instead give rise to tort-like responsibility
for reliance damages).
34. Thus, even Fried agrees that unlike silent vows, promises are by their nature and
purpose relational: They take moral effect if and when they are both communicated to
and accepted by the promisee.
[W]hat is [the] additional element that transforms a vow or a commitment to
oneself into a promise to another? . . .
The case of the vow shows that a promise is something essentially
communicated to someone—to the promisee . . . . A promise is relational; it
invokes trust, and so its communication is essential. . . . [A] further necessary
condition of promissory obligation [is] that the promise be accepted.
The need for acceptance shows the moral relation of promising to be
voluntary on both sides.
Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 42–43.
35. By providing an individual with assurance that she will receive the promised
performance, a bargained-for promise can induce the promisee to assist the promisor in
pursuing his self-regarding ends, and a gift promise can induce a prospective gift recipient to
beneficially rely on the prospective gift, thereby promoting the promisor’s other-regarding
ends by maximizing the benefit his gift confers on the recipient.
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taken a moral responsibility to perform the promise. Once the promisee
believes the promisor is morally accountable for the promise, she will believe that her promisor has a practical reason to perform and that she has
remedial moral rights against the promisor if he fails to perform. As a
result, she will increase her estimate of the probability of performance,
lower her estimate of her likely losses from nonperformance, and change
her behavior accordingly. Thus, promises serve their essential purpose
only if by making them a promisor justifies his promisee in believing that
he is morally accountable for his promise.
By making subjective intent a necessary condition for making a
promise, however, Fried’s account conditions promissory obligation on
the occurrence of an inherently unverifiable event. The subjective theory
of intent thus severely reduces the promisor’s ability to assure the promisee that she has received an actual, rather than merely apparent, promise. Manifestations of promises cannot themselves eliminate the risk that
an apparent promise is a “merely objective promise”: an objective promise made without subjective intent.36 On the subjective theory, apparent
promisees37 know that nothing prevents an apparent promisor from
avoiding promissory responsibility by mentally crossing his fingers when
he makes his apparent promise. It appears that a promise will be capable
of serving its essential purpose only if the promisee has reasons independent of the apparent promise itself to believe that her promisor subjectively intended to make a promise when he made his apparent promise.
If the promisee knows the promisor to be predisposed to tell the truth in
general, or under the circumstances in which he promised, then the
promisor’s apparent promise might assure the promisee that she has received an actual promise. But by conditioning the practical effect of
promising entirely on factors external to the practice of promising, the
subjective theory threatens to reduce the role of promising to vindicating
the intent of only those individuals who make promises to people who
already trust them. There would be little reason to make a promise to a
promisee who has no independent reason to trust him. But individuals in
fact do make such promises. On the subjective theory, the same moral
effect could and should have been achieved by making a silent vow.
36. If accurate lie detection technology existed, or sound empirical psychology
demonstrated that certain kinds of voluntary conduct were highly correlated with truthtelling, then promisors could use that technology or undertake such conduct in order to
assure their promisees that they subjectively intended the apparent promises they made to
them. As use of such technology or knowledge became widely dispersed, they would, in
effect, eliminate the practical difference between subjective and objective promises.
37. For ease of exposition, I will use the term “apparent promisee” to refer to an
individual who is justified in believing that another has made a promise to her based on
that person’s manifestation of an intention to make a promise, the term “apparent
promisor” to refer to the person who manifests such an intention, and the term “apparent
promise” to refer to the manifestation of that intention. A “merely objective promise,”
therefore, is one made by an apparent promisor to an apparent promisee without the
subjective intent to promise.
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Fried’s account therefore seems unable to explain why individuals make
promises to people who do not already trust them.
Fried argues, however, that while merely objective promises do not
create moral obligations, individuals who make them do have a moral duty
to use reasonable care to avoid misleading others. Individuals who negligently make merely objective promises, and then disappoint the expectations they create, therefore have a moral duty to compensate their apparent promisees, presumably for their detrimental reliance.38 Presumably,
individuals who do so intentionally would be subject to additional moral
sanctions as well. Thus, on Fried’s account, it is not pointless to make a
genuine promise even to someone who has no independent reason to
believe the promisor: The apparent promise alone imposes a moral duty
even on the merely objective promisor. A merely objective promise creates a practical reason for the promisor to perform and entitles the apparent promisee to remedial moral rights if he fails to perform. In short,
when a promisee receives an objective promise, she can be confident that
her promisor will be morally accountable for his promise whether or not
he subjectively intended the promise. He will be bound by either a moral
obligation or duty, both of which entitle the promisee to remedial moral
rights if the promisor does not perform. Thus, even if promises create
genuine promissory responsibility only when they are subjectively intended, individuals have reason to make genuine promises even to promisees who cannot verify their subjective intent. On Fried’s view, it appears
that the power of genuine promises to change the practical reasoning of
promisees is diminished only by the risk that someone might nonneg38. Fried equivocates on the precise nature of the compensation that negligent
promisors must pay to their apparent promisees. For example, Fried claims that the actual
basis of liability for purely objective promises is revealed by the law’s resolution of
unilateral mistake cases in which one party failed to take due care:
[A]s between the two parties the one who had acted reasonably and in the
ordinary course should not have his expectations disappointed. He should not be
disappointed because . . . if a loss is inevitable and both parties are innocent, the
careless man should not be able to cast that loss on the prudent . . . . [This
reason] may be referred to consideration of fairness or to the encouragement of
due care.
Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 62. Here, Fried appears to hold that the party
who carelessly made a unilateral mistake should be held to the contract he did not intend
to make—the innocent party should not have his “expectations” disappointed. But Fried
makes clear that he believes the basis of liability in this case is necessarily noncontractual:
“The futile attempt to bring these cases under the promise principle only plays into the
hands of those who see nonpromissory principles of fairness at work throughout the law of
contract.” Id. at 63. But if the liability is noncontractual and grounded in the negligent
party’s failure to use due care, the appropriate remedy would be reliance damages, not
expectation damages. Indeed, Fried states that “it is my contention that mistake [cases] . . .
are a species of accident too—contractual accident.” Id. at 65. If, as Fried suggests, only
subjective intent can create contractual liability, then it follows that liability for a merely
objective promise imposed on the basis of the apparent promisor’s failure to use due care
is a species of tort liability, which triggers a duty to compensate for wrongful losses, not lost
expectancy.
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ligently make a merely objective promise by accident. The losses caused
by these “no fault,” accidental, merely objective promises would be allocated according to principles that fall outside the domain of Fried’s autonomy-based moral theory, such as principles of loss sharing grounded
in considerations of fairness or equality.39
But Fried’s defense of the subjective theory fails to recognize that
genuine promises and merely objective promises provide promisees with
different kinds of reasons for acting. As I argue below, genuine promises
create moral obligations, whose violation typically gives rise to the remedial moral right of expectation damages.40 Merely objective promises are
subject to moral duties, whose violation gives rise to the remedial moral
right of reliance damages. More fundamentally, I will argue that, unlike
the remedial moral rights to which violation of moral duties gives rise, the
content of the remedial moral rights to which breach of promise gives
rise is within the power of the promisor to determine. Therefore, under
the subjective theory, although stranger promisees will know that their
promisor will likely be morally accountable for his apparent promise,41
they will not know whether breach will entitle them only to the remedial
moral rights of a tort victim to be compensated for his wrongful losses
(reliance damages) or the remedial moral rights of a genuine promisee
(typically expectation damages). Compared to the objective theory of intent, the subjective theory undermines the promisor’s control over, and
typically dilutes, the potential effect that genuine promises can have on
the practical reasoning of their promisees.42 By holding that promisees
who receive merely objective promises receive the same remedial moral
rights as those who receive genuine promises, the objective theory ensures the intended effect of genuine promises on promisees. Because
genuine promises serve their purpose only to the extent that they affect
the practical reasoning of promisees, genuine promisors would want to
control the effect of their promises on their promisees’ practical reasoning. Thus, they would choose to make their promises objectively binding—
39. Fried would treat such cases like mistake cases, in which “nonpromissory
principles of fairness” apply. Id. at 63.
40. See infra Part II.
41. This would be true unless the promisor objectively promised by accident and
without fault. See supra text accompanying note 39.
42. Indeed, Fried himself makes much the same argument in defense of his claim that
breach of contract should trigger a duty to pay expectation rather than reliance damages:
To bind me to do no more than to reimburse your reliance is to excuse me to that
extent from the obligation I undertook. If your reliance is less than your
expectation . . . , then to that extent a reliance standard excuses me from the very
obligation I undertook and so weakens the force of an obligation I chose to
assume. Since by hypothesis I chose to assume the obligation in its stronger form
(that is, to render the performance promised) . . . , the reliance rule indeed
precludes me from incurring the very obligation I chose to undertake at the time
of promising.
Fried, Contract as Promise, supra note 1, at 19.
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morally effective as genuine promises whether or not they were subjectively intended.
The personal sovereignty account is committed to respecting the
right of individuals not only to choose their ends but also to choose how
to pursue their ends, consistent with a like liberty for others. Personal
sovereignty therefore must endorse the objective theory as necessary to
vindicate the right of individuals to choose to make objectively binding
promises as a means of pursuing their ends, unless doing so is inconsistent with respect for the personal sovereignty of others. Of course, by
holding that purely objective promises entitle promisees to the same remedial moral rights that genuine promises create, the objective theory
subjects merely objective promisors to a moral responsibility that they did
not subjectively intend to incur. All else equal, personal sovereignty must
also respect the right of individuals to be free of moral obligations they
did not subjectively intend to undertake. Respect for the intent of merely
objective promisors argues against the objective theory of intent.
There is, therefore, an internal tension within the personal sovereignty account between according full respect for the positive right of
individuals (who both subjectively and objectively intend their promises)
to choose to undertake objectively binding promises and the negative
right of individuals (merely objective promisors) to be free from subjectively unintended obligations. The positive right argues for the objective
theory of intent, while the negative right argues for the subjective theory.
But at least for some merely objective promisors, all else is not equal.
The personal sovereignty rights of genuine promisors, who would choose
to make objectively binding promises, trump the personal sovereignty
rights of individuals who negligently or intentionally make merely objective promises. Were personal sovereignty to refuse to treat objective
promises as morally binding, it would infringe the positive liberty of individuals to choose the kinds of obligations they wish to undertake. The
only reason to infringe this positive liberty is to avoid infringing the negative liberty of other individuals who make merely objective promises. But
personal sovereignty must give priority to respect for the positive liberty
of faultless individuals over the negative liberty of blameworthy individuals. It cannot justify a refusal to give moral effect to objective promises
solely on the ground that it is necessary to respect the negative liberty of
individuals whose own negligence or intentional wrongdoing created the
otherwise avoidable conflict between their own negative liberty and the
positive liberty of others.
Although Fried’s theory holds that merely objective promisors are
morally responsible for the direct harm they cause, he limits their remedial moral responsibility to the duty of compensating their promisee’s
detrimental reliance. This limitation itself, however, prevents Fried’s theory from respecting the right of genuine promisors to choose to undertake objectively binding promises. Fried never acknowledges or justifies
the sacrifice of personal sovereignty that results from his refusal to treat
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merely objective promisors as if they had made a genuine promise. The
foundational commitment to personal sovereignty, therefore, insists that
even merely objective promises should be treated as genuine promises.
However, personal sovereignty must carve out an exception for individuals who nonnegligently make objective promises by accident. Within
the personal sovereignty account, there is no ground for subordinating
their negative liberty to be free of unintended moral obligations. It is
therefore not possible for the personal sovereignty account to accord full
respect for both the positive liberty of individuals to choose to make objectively binding promises and the negative liberty of individuals who
nonnegligently make merely objective promises by accident. Full respect
for one entails diminished respect for the other. The moral treatment of
such accidental promises must therefore be determined by the nonpromissory principles governing nonnegligent accidents contained
within a comprehensive moral theory that extends beyond the personal
sovereignty account.43
43. David Owens rejects the view that individuals can incur a promissory obligation by
making an unintentional promise. But the example on which he relies to make his point
establishes only that individuals who accidentally and nonnegligently make objective
promises cannot incur a genuine promissory obligation:
A and B are currently participating in a marriage ceremony, but A is under the
false impression that his old flame B is kindly standing in for his true love C at a
rehearsal and that the real marriage to C will take place the next day. Suppose
there is no doubt that A was under this misapprehension. Is he now under at
least a moral obligation to B that should prevent him from marrying C the next
day? A has certainly behaved in a way that could reasonably be taken to express
an intention to bind himself to B, yet surely A is not obliged to forgo marriage
with C. This is especially obvious where there has been no negligence on A’s part.
David Owens, A Simple Theory of Promising, 115 Phil. Rev. 51, 60 (2006) (citing Elizabeth
Anscombe, Ethics, Religion and Politics 11 (1981)). On the personal sovereignty account,
if A’s belief was formed negligently but B’s was not, A would be subject to (the moral
equivalent of) a genuine promissory obligation. (I argue below, however, that this
conclusion does not entail that A would be morally required to forgo marrying C, as Owens
supposes. Rather, by marrying C, A would violate his obligation to B, which would give rise
to whatever remedial moral rights attach to the violation of A’s obligation. See infra Part
I.C. Further argument is required to establish that this remedial moral right would impose
a correlative moral duty on A to forgo marrying C—a version of “injunctive” moral relief.)
However, as Owens presents it, the example presents a case in which neither A’s nor B’s
beliefs were negligently formed: A has the objectively reasonable but mistaken belief that
B understands she is a mere stand-in at a rehearsal, and B has the objectively reasonably
but mistaken belief that A is actually marrying her (and is presumably making the promises
required to accomplish that act). Under these circumstances, the personal sovereignty
account, like Owens’s account, would not impose promissory liability on A. Rather, such a
“no fault” accident case would be resolved by the principles governing nonnegligent
accidents contained within the comprehensive moral theory that includes but extends
beyond the personal sovereignty account. Notably, contract law follows suit, refusing to
impose contractual liability for such objective promises and instead treating such cases as
accidents that void the promises ab initio on the ground of mutual mistake. See, e.g.,
Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.) (holding that no contract was
formed due to contracting parties’ mutual mistake that they were referring to same ship
named “Peerless” when they were in fact referring to two different ships with that name);
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This argument for the objective theory of promissory obligation rests
on the premise that the nature of promissory obligation is determined by
inference from the foundational substantive principle underwriting the
theory of moral responsibility that purports to explain and justify the
practice of promising. Thus, promissory obligation is objective because a
theory of morality grounded in respect for personal sovereignty supports
a practice of promising in which individuals incur promissory obligations
(or their moral equivalent) when they make objective promises, unless
they nonnegligently do so by accident. Alternative approaches to moral
theory, however, might object that the conditions under which promissory obligations arise cannot be inferred simply from the foundational
substantive commitments of a moral theory: The nature of promissory
obligation cannot be definitionally legislated to suit the demands of a
substantive moral commitment to respecting personal sovereignty. On
such an alternative approach, the nature of particular kinds of familiar
moral obligations are not up for grabs, depending on the best substantive
moral arguments for defining their features in various ways. Instead, the
constitutive features of moral obligations are facts about the world that
we must discover, not features of the moral universe that we can fashion
to suit our substantive moral commitments. Their structure and substance is determined at least in part by the nature of the concept of a
promise. On some views, the character of promissory obligation might be
a predetermined conceptual truth. For example, some might argue that
self-imposed moral responsibilities are necessarily intentionally incurred
(in the same analytic sense of necessity in which all bachelors are necessarily unmarried males). Thus, promissory obligations necessarily must be
intentionally incurred. On other views, the character of promissory obligation might be determined, at least in part, by the inferential role the
concept of promissory obligation plays in the social practice of promising.44 Thus, that the practice of promising would fully respect the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy by imposing promissory liability for objective promises provides no reason to believe that the practice
of promising in fact imposes objective promissory liability. The question
of whether promissory obligations are objective or subjective, then, is a
matter to be determined either by conceptual analysis or social convention, not by inference from a fundamental substantive moral
commitment.
While it is possible that the character of promissory obligation is constrained or determined a priori by its conceptual structure, this would
mean only that the moral responsibility for making objective promises
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 152 (1981) (summarizing when mistake makes
contract voidable). Any losses are then apportioned according to noncontract doctrines.
44. For two versions of such an approach, see generally Coleman, supra note 20, at
7–12 (explaining and endorsing “inferential role semantics”); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 Legal Theory 457 (2000) (explaining and endorsing
“pragmatic conceptualism”).
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could not properly be described as promissory. The fundamental commitment to personal sovereignty, however, would still provide grounds
for holding individuals equally morally responsible for objective
promises, even if that responsibility cannot properly be described as
promissory. The important point is that the basic theory of moral responsibility underlying the promise principle provides grounds for holding
individuals equally responsible for apparent promises, whether or not
they subjectively intended to promise. The conceptual claim seems to
put no more than nomenclature at stake. Likewise, while the social practice view of promising might provide a plausible account of the structure
of the obligations created or recognized by the actual practice of promising we have, the argument in defense of the objective theory of promising
demonstrates that any practice that falls short of attaching (at least the
moral equivalent of) a fully promissory obligation to objective promises is
morally objectionable: It is inconsistent with the fundamental commitment to personal sovereignty that underwrites moral obligation, the very
category of moral responsibility on which the existence of promissory responsibility depends. That commitment either explains why individuals
in fact incur objective promissory obligations notwithstanding the limitations of the social practice of promising (i.e., the practice does not exhaust the mechanisms available for incurring promissory obligations), or
argues in favor of revising the social practice to accord with the demands
of the foundational theory that underwrites all self-imposed moral
responsibility.45
C. The Remedial Rights and Duties of Promissory Morality
The initial problem facing a correspondence account of legal remedies is to identify the remedial moral duties to which legal remedies
might correspond. But moral theories specifying first-order responsibilities often do not specify the remedial, or second-order, moral responsibilities, if any, that individuals incur when they violate first-order moral responsibilities. In the case of promising, the deontic moral theories that
45. Although Michael Pratt denies the conceptual possibility of subjectively
unintended promissory obligations, he acknowledges the force of the argument for
holding that individuals who make objective promises are subject to the same moral
consequences of making a subjective promise:
It may be that, having conveyed to you an intention to obligate myself to do X
without actually possessing that intention, I become subject to the same moral
requirement (to do X, say) as if I had in fact made a promise. It may be
appropriate, in other words, that I be treated as if I promised despite the fact that
I did not do so. An important function of the practice of promising is to provide
an easy solution to small coordination problems by enabling people to provide
others with reliable assurances about the future. To serve this purpose, the
practice must permit one to rely on what, by outward appearances, is a promise. . . .
Reasons of this sort might plausibly provide moral grounds for requiring of me
precisely what morality would require of me had I actually made a promise.
Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, supra note 3, at 815.
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explain promissory obligation typically lack an account of the nature or
content of the remedial moral duty to which breach gives rise.46 A strong
correspondence account of contract cannot justify a remedial legal duty
on the ground that it corresponds to the first-order moral obligation to
keep a promise unless that obligation entails a second-order (remedial)
moral duty for its breach. Likewise, a weak correspondence account cannot fault contract law for failing to enforce a first-order moral obligation
to keep a promise unless contract law fails to enforce the second-order
(remedial) moral duty to which breach of promise gives rise.
The moral objection to expectation damages summarized at the outset holds that in order to justify the legal enforcement of A’s promise to B
to do X on the ground that it enforces the promissory obligation created
by A’s promise, the law must require A to do X if doing X remains possible after breach. In doctrinal terms, the legal remedy for A’s breach must
be specific performance.47 But the moral objection simply refers to the
first-order promissory obligation to do X as grounds for concluding that
violations of that obligation give rise to a second-order moral duty to do
X if doing X remains possible after breach. It seems to treat the inference from a promissory obligation to a remedial performance duty as
analytic—an inference that follows from the concept of promissory obligation itself.48 But while it is certainly true that a promise to do X entails
the promissory obligation to do X, the violation of that obligation neither
46. Two salient exceptions include the extensive philosophical literatures on the
moral theory of punishment and the political theory of reparations for historical wrongs.
For a discussion of the moral theory of punishment, see generally Hugo Adam Bedau,
Punishment, pt. 3, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Edward N. Zalta, 2003), at
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/punishment/#3 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
For a discussion of the political theory of reparations for historical wrongs, see generally
Tamar Meisels, Territorial Rights (2d ed. 2009); Reparations (Jon Miller & Rahul Kamar
eds., 2007); Jeremy Waldron, Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis, 5
Theoretical Inq. L. 237 (2004); Jeremy Waldron, Superseding Historic Injustice, 103 Ethics
4 (1992).
47. As we have seen, this objection presupposes a correspondence account of contract
law. Otherwise, the alleged failure of contract law to enforce A’s promissory obligation
would not count as an objection to using expectation damages as the default remedy in
contract. See supra text accompanying note 9.
48. Consider Dori Kimel’s puzzlement over Fried’s argument for expectation
damages:
[W]hen [Fried] writes that ‘[i]f I make a promise to you, I should do as I
promise; and if I fail to keep my promise, it is fair that I should be made to hand
over the equivalent of the promised performance,’ his narrative only begs the
question why not drop the ‘equivalent of’ bit; and when he commends
expectation damages for giving the victim of a breach . . . ‘the benefit of his
bargain,’ specific performance springs to mind as something which, when
applicable, could surely achieve this very aim more simply, more directly, and
more accurately. After all, specific performance is the remedy that aims at
granting the innocent party precisely what she bargained for, whereas
expectation damages merely aim at compensating her, albeit fully, for not
receiving what she bargained for. At best, . . . it is a second best.
Kimel, supra note 3, at 95.
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conceptually implies nor logically entails a remedial duty to do X.49 The
content of remedial moral duties does not necessarily correspond to the
content of the first-order moral responsibilities whose breach they remedy. Only a substantive, rather than conceptual, argument can bridge the
gap between the violation of a first-order moral responsibility and the
content of the remedial moral duty to which that violation gives rise.
Moreover, accounts of the remedial moral duties for violations of promissory obligations are subject to different substantive constraints than accounts of the remedial moral duties for violations of moral duties. The
remedial moral duties that attach to violations of promissory obligations,
like the legal duties that correspondence accounts attach to promissory
obligations, must themselves be consistent with the moral foundation
from which those obligations derive.50 A moral theory that mandates the
content of the remedial moral duties arising out of violations of first-order moral duties is not necessarily inconsistent with the moral theory from
which those first-order moral duties derive. But a moral theory that mandates the content of the remedial duties created by breach of promissory
obligations would be inconsistent with the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy from which those obligations derive. A foundational
commitment to personal sovereignty, therefore, requires any moral theory that imposes mandatory remedial moral duties for the violation of
moral obligations to justify the resulting limitation on the nature and extent of the moral responsibility it permits individuals voluntarily to incur.
If, for example, an individual wished to make a promise whose breach
triggered only a moral duty to apologize, a moral theory foundationally
committed to respect for the personal sovereignty conception of individual autonomy would be hard pressed to explain why that individual
should not have this option.51 If personal sovereignty explains and justifies promissory obligations on the ground that they vindicate the will of
the individuals who incur them, then the remedial moral duties, if any,
49. In addition, once a promise has been breached, it is conceptually impossible to
perform the promised act. If the time for performance has expired, specific performance
cannot be understood as an equivalent to performance of the promise, but rather at most
constitutes performance of the act promised. If breach is by way of anticipatory
repudiation, then the repudiation breaches an implied duty not to state an unequivocal
intention not to perform. Subsequent performance of the act promised still cannot qualify
as performance of the promise, since its performance required nonrepudiation. Thus,
specific performance does not make the promisor perform the promise, but at best makes
him perform the promised act. It therefore does not correspond to the moral duty the
promisor violated, which required the promisor to perform the promised act by a certain
time and without repudiating before that time expired.
50. See supra Part I.A for a discussion of the relationship between legal duties and
first-order promissory obligations, and the argument that promissory morality would forbid
the enforcement of promises intended not to be legally enforceable.
51. As noted earlier, on Strawson’s view of the nature of moral discourse, it follows
(from the fact that the promisor committed a moral wrong) that it is morally appropriate
for the promisee to express condemnation and resentment toward the breacher and for
the breacher to express regret and to apologize to the promisee. See supra note 28.
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that attach to the violation of those obligations should also be subject to
the will of the individuals who create the obligations.52 If autonomy underwrites the moral liability, so to speak, then it should also underwrite
the moral remedy.
To be sure, a moral theory could make the content of the remedial
moral duties for promissory obligations mandatory without undermining
the voluntary character of the moral responsibility promisors assume. In
such a moral regime, promisors still freely choose to subject themselves to
remedial moral duties with mandatory content when they freely choose to
incur the promissory obligations to which those remedial moral duties
attach. However, although such a theory does respect the right of individuals to choose their promissory obligations, and in that sense makes
the assumption of the remedial moral duties attached to them voluntary
as well, it nonetheless unjustifiably deprives them of the right to choose
the content of the remedial moral duties that will attach to the promissory obligations they choose to undertake. That deprivation is substantively inconsistent with the principle of personal sovereignty that both
underwrites promissory obligations and ultimately grounds the remedial
moral duties to which their violation gives rise. Thus, to justify the legal
enforcement of the moral obligation to keep a promise, correspondence
accounts must look to the voluntary choice of promisors not only to identify their promissory obligations but to determine their remedial moral
duties as well.53
52. Of course, individual will here is to be construed objectively. See supra Part I.B.
53. Shiffrin appears to reject this claim:
One might attempt to recharacterize the divergent contract rules that I identify
instead as rules that inform the content of what is promised between
contractors. . . . I doubt that one may alter by declaration or by agreement the
moral significance of a broken promise . . . . A promise may make a nonobligatory
action obligatory, but only because the object of the obligation is within the
promisor’s power in the first place . . . . By contrast, the power to alter the
significance and appropriateness of others’ reactions to a broken obligation is not
within the power of the promisor. It does not seem to be the sort of thing that
could be altered by consent or made part of the content of the promise. In
response to another’s wrong, we have the elective power to forgive, but
forgiveness involves, among other things, recognition of a past wrong . . . .
Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 727–29.
Shiffrin’s argument conflates two kinds of “moral significance” of broken promises.
The first is the appropriateness of the promisee’s reaction and the promisee’s right to
withhold or grant forgiveness. The second is the remedial moral duty that attaches to a
promissory obligation. Perhaps, on a Strawsonian view, it is a conceptual or conventional
truth that the concept of breach entails the moral right to grant or withhold forgiveness
and to feel and express condemnation and contempt for the promisor. See generally
Strawson, supra note 28. If so, then aggrieved promisors cannot alter the moral legitimacy
of an aggrieved promisee’s reactions to suffering the moral wrong of breach. That
promisors lack that power, however, has no bearing on my argument that the promisor
necessarily has the power to completely determine the content of the remedial moral duty
that binds him upon breach.
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I have argued that objective intention (typically) gives rise to either
promissory obligation or a moral equivalent.54 Thus, the content of the
remedial moral duties attaching to promissory obligations should also
turn on the objective intention of the promisor. When a promisor expressly manifests his intention to attach a particular remedial moral duty
to his promissory obligation, morality must ratify his choice by giving
moral effect to that remedial duty and no other. Similarly, for a strong
correspondence account of contract, the remedial legal duty must correspond to the remedial moral duty that the promisor expressly undertook.
A strong correspondence account cannot impose a legal remedy that fails
to correspond to the moral remedy, and the promisor’s intent is the sole
source of the content of the moral remedy for breaking a promise. But
what remedy should a strong correspondence account adopt for cases in
which the promisor failed, either expressly or implicitly, to indicate the
content of the remedial moral duty to be attached to his promissory obligation? Here, the moral theory of promising faces the same challenge
that preoccupies the theory of contract: What default rules should morality (contract) use to prevent gaps in promissory obligations arising out of
the promisor’s failure to indicate his intention? Gaps in manifested intention arise because the promisor either failed to form the relevant intention or failed to manifest the intention he formed. By hypothesis, the
idiosyncratic evidence in any such case will not resolve this ambiguity.
Contract law solves this problem by adopting default rules that provide a set of terms, or mechanisms for generating them, that will be imputed into all contracts unless the parties indicate otherwise. With a few
possible exceptions,55 contract default rules are best understood as attempts to impute into contracts terms that most similarly situated parties
54. The proviso accommodates the exception to promissory responsibility for merely
objective promises made by accident. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
55. One exception is the so-called “information forcing” or “penalty” default rule.
See Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Ascent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1547,
1549 (1999) (describing information forcing or penalty default rule as forcing “the
disclosure of information that will yield efficient contractual relationships”); Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (explaining penalty defaults are “purposefully set at what
the parties would not want—in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to
each other or third parties”); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 Yale L.J. 729, 735–36 (1992)
(noting penalty default serves as “counterexample to those who would argue that default
rules should simply replicate the contracts that a majority of parties would make in the
absence of transaction costs”); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded
Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73
Cal. L. Rev. 261, 263–64 (1985) (discussing interplay between default and privately
negotiated rules); Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of
Contract Default Rules, 100 Yale L.J. 615, 616 (1990) (describing penalty default as forcing
“revelation of information which the revealing party might generally wish not to reveal”).
There is, however, some doubt about whether any existent default rules actually qualify as
penalty defaults. See generally Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in
Contract Law, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 563 (2006). However, any penalty default that turns
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would have wanted to include had they considered them. Majoritarian
default rules maximize the probability that the terms to which promisors
are being held correspond with the ones they intended but failed to express or imply, and they save the majority of individuals the costs of specifying those terms, which respects their personal sovereignty by decreasing
the barriers to creating promissory obligations. Thus, majoritarian default rules can be justified as a method of interpreting promises
grounded on the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy. Of
course, the default rule approach to promissory interpretation creates the
risk that some promisors will be held to terms that they did not intend,
because they either intended but failed to indicate an incompatible term
or failed to form any relevant intention. In those cases, individuals would
be subject to a promissory obligation at odds with or unsupported by
their subjective intention. As we have seen, deontic moral theorists such
as Fried argue that a subjectively unintended promissory obligation is a
contradiction in terms.56 Fried would insist that if the promisor formed,
but failed to indicate, his subjective intention, the imposition of a contrary moral responsibility would necessarily conflict with, rather than constitute, a moral obligation.57 Similarly, for Fried, in any true gap case—a
case in which the promisor formed no relevant intention—no promissory
obligation could arise, thus relegating the solution to disputes over matters arising under but not governed by promises to other areas of moral
responsibility enforced by other areas of the law, such as torts and restitution. Notably, Fried does not necessarily object to the resolution of such
disputes by adverting to default rules. He just insists that the resulting
moral and legal liability they impose sound, respectively, in nonpromissory moral responsibility and noncontract law.58

out to be economically justified on the ground that it reduces informational barriers would
also enjoy the support of an autonomy-based moral theory.
In addition to penalty default rules, there are also paternalistic default rules—typically
designed to protect consumers—that deliberately impute nonmajoritarian terms into
contracts. In some cases the terms are mandatory. In others, they are so-called “legal
information forcing” rules designed to force sophisticated commercial parties to make
consumers aware of their contractual rights and duties. If their purported justifications are
sound, all of these alternative default rules would likely be supported by an autonomybased moral theory of promising.
56. See supra notes 10, 32 & 38.
57. Fried does argue, however, that a promissory obligation does not bind until it is
accepted by the promisee, which requires the promisor to communicate it. Fried, Contract
as Promise, supra note 1, at 40–43. Yet he also claims that any moral responsibility that
conflicts with a subjectively intended moral responsibility, or fails to correspond to one, is
by definition not a promissory obligation. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, supra note
9, at 703–06 (outlining Fried’s contract theory).
58. See Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, supra note 9, at 717–30 (drawing
distinction between interpretation and interpolation in contract law as necessitating
resolution in contract law and noncontract law, respectively, based on subjective intention
of parties).
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Fried’s objection to the default rule approach to promissory interpretation shares the basic premise of his objection to the objective theory
of intent: Respect for individual autonomy entails that promissory liability must arise from subjective intent. Yet I have argued that a foundational commitment to the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy
is not only compatible with, but likely requires, an objective theory of
intent for promissory obligations.59 Similarly, that commitment supports
a majoritarian default regime for interpreting promissory obligations.
Just as the commitment to personal sovereignty justifies the use of objective intent as the best means of facilitating the voluntary creation of moral
responsibility, it also justifies the use of majoritarian default rules: In
equilibrium, default rules provide the regime most likely to maximize the
convergence of objective and subjective intent with respect to all the
terms of promissory obligations, while minimizing the costs of creating
those obligations in the first place. Through ordinary understanding,
morality must by default imply terms into promises absent a promisor’s
contrary manifestation of intention. Just as individuals operating under a
promissory regime based on objective intent can avoid an unintentional
promissory obligation by learning to conform their outward manifestations of intention to their subjective intentions, individuals take
majoritarian promissory default rules into account when they make and
receive promises, thereby decreasing the occasions on which they incur
promissory obligations with terms that conflict with their subjective intent. Moreover, since the default rules, by hypothesis, impute terms that
most individuals would want in their promises, the probability of a conflict between subjectively and objectively intended terms is minimized.60
Finally, in those cases in which promisors failed to form a relevant intention, majoritarian default rules maximize the chance that the resolution
of their dispute reflects the terms they would have chosen had they considered them. The assurance that promissory gaps will be filled in a manner congenial to their interests decreases the expected costs, and increases the expected benefits, of promising. Thus, a promissory morality
that fails to hold promisors morally bound by majoritarian default terms
unnecessarily increases the costs of promising, thereby violating the positive liberty of individuals to undertake moral obligations as they see fit. A
personal sovereignty account of autonomy cannot countenance a promissory regime that gratuitously exacerbates, rather than minimizes, the
costs of exercising the individual liberty to make promises.
As I noted above, Fried would not necessarily object to the use of
majoritarian default rules to resolve disputes over matters not governed
by subjective intention, but would insist that the moral responsibility im59. See supra Part I.B.
60. In addition, on average, individuals intending idiosyncratic terms might be more
likely to be aware of their idiosyncrasy and thus to manifest their idiosyncratic intentions
clearly.
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posed is not promissory.61 I have argued that majoritarian default rules
should be used to interpret promises when resolution of a dispute cannot
be determined on the basis of objective intent. In my view, the resulting
moral responsibility could properly be viewed as a promissory obligation
even though it is not derived from subjective intent. But the question of
whether the moral responsibility imposed by interpretive default rules
qualifies as promissory or falls within some other category of moral responsibility may not matter. My claim is simply that the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy supports the use of (economically justified) majoritarian default rules for resolving disputes over the content of
promises that promisees cannot verify by reference to objective intent.
A strong correspondence account of contract, then, would determine the appropriate content of legal remedies for breach by identifying
the corresponding remedial moral duty that attached to a breached
promissory obligation. If that duty cannot be established by identifying
the promisor’s objective intention, then a majoritarian default rule
should be used to determine it. If most individuals would choose expectation damages, then the promisor has the remedial moral duty to pay
expectation damages. A strong correspondence account of contract
would make that duty legally enforceable. If most individuals would
choose specific performance instead, then the promisor has the moral
duty to perform following breach and the promisee has the right to demand performance following breach. A strong correspondence account
would then enforce that right by legally requiring specific performance.
There is, of course, an extensive and complex literature in law and economics addressing the question of which contract remedies would maximize the joint expected value of promises at the time they are made, and
therefore would be preferred by most promisors.62 The correct default
rules are, in many areas, subject to dispute. But the controversy surrounding default rules only shows that the question of promissory interpretation to resolve disputes over matters not governed by objective intention is difficult. Nonetheless, I maintain that moral theories of
promise can no more avoid it than can theories of contract.

61. See, e.g., supra notes 10, 32 & 38; see also Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law,
supra note 9, at 717–30 (“Fried’s theory clearly requires that contractual obligation be
based on shared subjective intentions, and therefore rejects the objective theory of
contract because it imposes contractual liability in the absence of such intentions.”).
62. For a general discussion and overview of the literature, see Benjamin E. Hermalin
et al., Contract Law, in The Handbook of Law and Economics 3, 99–127 (A. Mitchell
Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Craswell, Contract Remedies, supra note 6; Richard
Craswell, Instrumental Theories of Compensation, 40 San Diego L. Rev. 1135 (2003); Paul
Mahoney, Contract Remedies: General, in 3 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics § 4600,
at 117 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). See generally Robert Cooter
& Thomas Ulen, Law & Economics 245–79 (5th ed. 2007).
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II. ASSESSING DIVERGENCE
I began this Article with the standard moral objection to expectation
damages. That objection implicitly invokes a correspondence account of
contract as grounds for criticizing contract law for its failure to force the
promisor to perform his breached promise. By now it should be clear
that the objection misunderstands the relationship between contract and
promise. Contract law certainly enforces promissory morality to the extent that it enforces the promisor’s explicit intention to assume a remedial obligation. (To the extent it does not, contract no doubt diverges
from promise.)63 But contract law also enforces promissory morality
when it imposes the default remedy of expectation damages. Expectation
damages can be justified as the law’s best guess about the remedial moral
duty that most promisors would prefer. And in any event, specific performance does not enjoy a presumption in its favor. When A promises B
to do X, there is no conceptual or other ground for inferring that A also
intends to assume a remedial moral duty to do X if he breaches his promise. Moreover, if promissory morality is grounded in the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy, it would not recognize any mandatory
constraints on the content of the remedial moral duties A is permitted to
attach to his moral obligation to do X. A one-size-fits-all remedial moral
duty is incompatible with a foundational commitment to personal
autonomy.
It is important to note, however, that this understanding of the content of remedial moral duties, and thus of the proper basis for assessing
the correspondence of contract and promise, does not reduce to a
Holmesian view of promise (Holmes’s actual view is about contract, not
promise).64 If A promises B to do X (and thus makes a “single” promise),
but assumes a remedial moral duty only to pay B’s detrimental reliance
due to breach, it does not follow that A’s promise can be properly translated into a promise to do X or pay money (a true “alternative” promise).
A crucial moral distinction is lost in this translation. If A promises B to
do X or pay money, then when A pays money he discharges his moral
obligation. But if A promises B to do X and thereby also undertakes only
the remedial moral duty to pay B’s reliance upon breach, then when A
fails to do X he breaches his moral obligation and wrongs B. When A
compensates B’s reliance losses, he discharges his remedial moral duty
but does not thereby right the moral wrong of his breach. Just as legal
remedies do not right legal wrongs, moral remedies do not cure moral
wrongs, including breach of promise. Economic analysts of contract law
tend to regard such distinctions in moral obligation as superfluous. For
63. Thus, contract law’s refusal to enforce an express penalty damages clause (in
excess of expectation damages) clearly fails to enforce the parties’ moral obligations. See
infra text accompanying notes 71–78 (analyzing punitive and liquidated damages).
64. See Holmes, Path of the Law, supra note 5, at 462 (“The duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and
nothing else.”).
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purposes of their models, they presume that all they need to know is the
price of performance and the price of breach.65 From their perspective,
there is no difference between the single promise case—in which the
promisor has the legal option of performing by doing X or paying money
as damages for breach—and the alternative promise case—in which the
promisor has the option of performing by either doing X or paying
money. Call it what you will, the single and alternative promisor both
face the costs of doing X or paying money, period. Why should economic analysts care whether the payment of money is denominated as the
discharge of a remedial moral duty for breach or the discharge of a performance duty? The names don’t change the price.
Recent developments in the economic analysis of contract law, however, clearly demonstrate that an economic model that fails to take into
account the distinction between performance and breach fails to capture
65. Indeed, economic analysts often fail even to note that the efficient breach
hypothesis might be interpreted as approving immoral conduct. The classic texts
explaining the theory of efficient breach have no discussion of the possible tension
between the law’s facilitation of efficient breaches and the immorality of breaking a
promise. See, e.g., Cooter & Ulen, supra note 62, at 208–12 (discussing efficient breach
but explicitly limiting analysis to promisors whose “concern with breach may not go
beyond his or her liability”); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 118–22 (7th ed.
2007) (explaining efficient breach, “which from an economic standpoint is the same case
as that of an involuntary breach”). Steven Shavell recently defended a variation on the
economic account of the theory of efficient breach. See Steven Shavell, Is Breach of
Contract Immoral?, 56 Emory L.J. 439 (2006) [hereinafter Shavell, Is Breach Immoral?].
Shavell claims that promisors should not break their promises because doing so is
immoral, but that truly efficient breaches of contract are often not immoral:
If damages tend to be fully compensatory, we could say . . . breach tends to be
moral, as breach should occur if and only if contracting parties would have
allowed nonperformance had they addressed in their contracts the contingencies
that engendered breach. But if damages are not really compensatory, breach
might be immoral.
Id. at 450. In his view, most breaches occur when the express promise underlying the
contract is underspecified. In those cases, he argues, promissory morality fills the gap by
imposing on the promisor the term to which he and his promisee would have agreed had
they specified an express term governing the gap. That term, he argues, would always
permit the promisor to breach (not perform) and pay (fully compensatory) expectation
damages:
[W]hen the measure of damages equals the expectation measure, sellers will be
led to commit breach if and only if the cost of performance exceeds the value of
performance to buyers. But this is exactly when a seller would have been excused
from performing in an explicit complete contract . . . . Accordingly, breach should
not be characterized as immoral under our assumptions.
Id. at 449. Thus, by allowing promisors to breach and pay expectation damages under
these circumstances, contract law is not endorsing the immoral act of breaking a promise.
For criticism of Shavell’s view, see Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?,
107 Mich. L. Rev. 1551 (2009) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Immoral] (arguing Shavell’s position
is unjustified and promise to perform morally does not mean promise to perform or pay).
For Shavell’s reply, see Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given
the Incompleteness of Contracts, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (2009) (explaining breach as
function of contract’s incompleteness as to all contingencies).
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an important and monetizable dimension of the costs and benefits of
promising. The economic theory of contract design now recognizes that
contracting parties use a combination of legally enforceable (or formal)
and legally unenforceable (or relational) norms to regulate their agreement.66 The optimal mix of these norms for any given agreement depends in part on how likely they are to motivate the parties to conform to
them. Informal norms change parties’ motivations by imposing costs for
noncompliance. Thus, economic analysts err when they disregard the additional costs parties incur by undertaking and then breaching moral obligations. Parties not only risk incurring instrumental harm in the form
of reputational costs, but, to the extent promisors have internalized
moral norms and are therefore motivated to conform to moral demands,
nonconformance imposes intrinsic (psychological) costs as well. In other
words, if given the option to choose between making one of the two
promises above—(1) a promise to do X or pay money for breach of the
promise to do X, or (2) a promise to do X or pay money, where payment
of money constitutes performance—most promisors would charge more
for the first. The first imposes on the promisor not only the costs of doing X or paying money, but also the risk of incurring the reputational
and personal costs of breaching a moral obligation. The second provides
the promisor the option of doing X or paying money, neither of which
requires him to breach a promissory obligation. Unless a promisor and
promisee are indifferent to morality, the Holmesian reduction of
promises whose breach triggers a duty to pay compensatory damages to
true alternative promises cannot be sustained, even for the economic analyst of contract.
The moral distinction between single and alternative promises also
clarifies the merits of the moral objection to the efficient breach hypothesis. Recall that the objection condemns the efficient breach hypothesis
for counseling the immoral act of breach whenever doing so would be in
the promisor’s interest. The objection insists on taking the doctrinal language of promise and breach literally. But the efficient breach hypothesis can be readily defended simply by reinterpreting it not to counsel
breach, but to claim that most promisors who make legally enforceable
single promises intend them to be morally alternative promises and that
promisees understand them as such.
Thus, when A promises B to do X against the background of the
default remedy of expectation damages, A should be understood to be
promising to do X or pay B the value he would have realized from A’s
doing X. Under ideal conditions, X and the payment of damages are
equivalent in value to B, so B should be indifferent between them. Given
B’s indifference, it seems perverse to suppose that B would nevertheless
66. For an overview of the economic analysis of the role of legal and non-legal (or
relational) norms in contract design, see generally Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott,
Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023, 1029–31,
1058–62 (2009).
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insist that A undertake a moral obligation to do X, rather than to do X or
pay B the monetary equivalent of X. If B is indifferent, then she would be
unwilling to pay the premium A would charge for the additional costs of
bearing the moral obligation to do X, which would morally prohibit him
from taking a superior alternative to performance even if he pays B the
equivalent value of performance.
The efficient breach hypothesis, then, really amounts to the claim
that most contracting parties will find it mutually beneficial to permit the
promisor, both legally and morally, to pay damages as an alternative to
performing the promised act. While the promisor’s payment in lieu of
performance is legally denominated “breach” and payment of “damages,”
the efficient breach hypothesis supposes that many parties—and most
commercially sophisticated parties—will intend and understand the
promisor to be discharging his moral obligation by compensating the
promisee, rather than paying damages for breach of a moral obligation.
In other words, the efficient breach hypothesis presumes that many parties use the remedial default rules of contract to specify a morally acceptable alternative to performance of their promised act instead of writing
an explicit alternative promise contract.67
It remains true, however, that even on the alternative promise interpretation of nominally (legally dominated) single promise cases, the
promisor’s refusal either to do X or pay compensation absent a court
order could constitute both a legal and moral breach. Thus, Shiffrin
writes:
It is out of bounds to say: “I solemnly promise to do X, but I
may fail to do so if something better comes along; moreover, if it
does, you can only expect X’s market value from me, although
you may need to enlist the help of others to pry it out of my
clenched fist. Further, let us now declare that should I fail, it
will not be the sort of thing deserving of moral reprobation so
long as eventually you are made whole monetarily. Moreover, it
67. There is a modest but growing empirical literature on the question of individuals’
attitudes toward breach of contract. See, e.g., David Baumer & Patricia Marschall, Willful
Breach of Contract for the Sale of Goods: Can the Bane of Business Be an Economic
Bonanza?, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 159, 171–72 (1992) (analyzing results of survey presenting
business community’s reaction to deliberate breach); Shavell, Is Breach Immoral?, supra
note 65, at 452–55 (presenting empirical study confirming Shavell’s contention that
individuals are less likely to view breach as immoral if parties would have agreed to allow
promisor to breach and pay expectation damages under circumstances in which breach in
fact occurred); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral
Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 405, 405 (2009) (summarizing
empirical study suggesting that “people are quite sensitive to the moral dimensions of a
breach of contract, especially the perceived intentions of the breacher”); Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, Beyond the Bottom Line: The Complexity of Outcome Assessment 28
(Aug. 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting
results of empirical study demonstrating that “the outcome of receiving expectation
damages was still regarded as significantly worse than the outcome of voluntary
performance of the contract”).
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is not the sort of thing you may be upset with me over or view as
showing my bad character.” This is not a full-fledged promise.68
Shiffrin here rightly points out that if the promise is to do X, and not
to do X or pay compensation, then no manner of temporizing in the
preamble or postscript of the promise can transform breach into performance, and thereby insulate the promisor from all the consequences
of breach. She is also right to imply that if the promisor knows performance requires doing X or paying compensation and he refuses to do either, thereby forcing the promisee to sue, then he is in breach of the
moral obligation created by his alternative promise. But if the promisor
in good faith believes either that he is not obligated to do X or pay compensation (for example, because he believes a condition precedent to his
duty has not occurred) or that he has performed by doing X (even
though the promisee disagrees), then a refusal to do X or pay compensation, respectively, is not necessarily morally wrong, even if a court ultimately decides he breached his promise. It may be fair to read into legally enforceable promises each party’s intention to preserve the moral
right to insist on the legal adjudication of any good faith dispute.
Shiffrin would clearly err, however, were she to insist that no promise
can permit a promisor to escape moral responsibility for failing to do a
promised act by paying compensation for that failure. By stipulating that
payment of such compensation constitutes performance, an alternative
promise accomplishes precisely this objective, and runs afoul of neither
legal nor moral prohibition.69 The promisor would also be morally free
to exercise the payment option just because “something better comes
along.” The promisor has moral license to restrict or expand his performance options as he sees fit (and the promisee will accordingly adjust
the price she pays for the promise).
Shiffrin’s real objection boils down to the claim that the nominal
promise to do X backed by the default remedy of expectation damages
should be taken literally—i.e., a failure to do X constitutes a breach of
promise followed by the imposition of damages for wrongful conduct.
But this is a contentious and undefended interpretation of the efficient
breach hypothesis, the Holmesian conception of a promise, and the tradition of the economic analysis of contract law that interprets nominally
single promises as the functional, and normative, equivalent of an alternative promise. While the economic account overlooks the moral (and
economic) importance of the difference between genuinely single
68. Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 728.
69. Shiffrin in fact acknowledges the moral permissibility of alternative promises. See
id. at 722 (“Absent the consent of the promisee, the moral requirement would not be
satisfied if the promisor merely supplied the financial equivalent of what was promised.”).
In another article, Shiffrin states that she is “not suggesting that parties could never
permissibly and explicitly make an agreement to ‘perform or pay.’ Rather, there is reason
to resist ‘perform or pay’ as the default interpretation of all promises that do not explicitly
rule it out.” Shiffrin, Immoral, supra note 65, at 1568.
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promises and nominally single promises that are de facto alternative
promises, its claim is that most parties—especially the sophisticated corporate and commercial parties to which it is usually applied—would likely
intend and understand their nominally single promises as alternative
promises. Rejecting this view requires denying the empirical claim that
sophisticated parties treat their nominally single promises as morally
equivalent to alternative promises, or defending the general view that
parties either cannot, or should not be able to, create the moral obligation of an alternative promise by using legal language that, according to
its plain meaning, creates a single promise.70 Philosophical arguments
cannot provide the former and have yet to attempt the latter.
Shiffrin claims that the contract doctrines governing punitive, liquidated, and consequential damages, as well as mitigation and consideration, also constitute morally objectionable instances of divergence between contract and promise. However, I argue below that most of these
doctrines can be defended on the ground that they ensure contract law’s
respect for a promissory morality based on personal sovereignty. Consider each in turn.
A. Punitive Damages
Contract law does not award punitive damages even for intentional
breach (although punitive damages are available if the promisor’s behavior also constitutes an intentional tort).71 Shiffrin argues that the law
generally awards punitive damages to “express the judgment that the behavior represents a wrong,” but by failing to make them available for intentional breach, “[contract law] thereby fails to use its distinctive powers
and modes of expression to mark a judgment that breach is impermissible as opposed to merely subject to a price.”72 Shiffrin’s objection here is
just another form of the objection against the Holmesian view of promise.
As discussed above, charitably interpreted, the Holmesian view does not
approve breach, or fail to disapprove it, but rather speculates that most
parties view the default remedy of payment of damages as a morally acceptable alternative performance, even though the promisor makes a
nominally single promise.73 The lack of availability of punitive damages
for intentional breach reflects the same judgment—that properly understood (i.e., as the parties likely understand their own agreement), failure
to perform the promise simply triggers the promisor’s alternative per70. For relevant empirical literature on the question of individuals’ attitudes toward
breach of contract, see supra note 67.
71. See Farnsworth, supra note 5, § 12.8, at 194–96 (“[A] court will not ordinarily
award damages that are described as ‘punitive,’ intended to punish the party in
breach . . . . Punitive damages may, however, be awarded in tort actions, and a number of
courts have awarded them for a breach of contract that is in some respect tortious.” (citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1979))).
72. Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 723–24.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 63–69.
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formance duty, which the law then enforces by entering a judgment requiring payment of expectation damages.74 Contract law’s refusal to
award punitive damages for the intentional failure to perform the act
promised by a commitment expressed as a single promise might reflect
the view that most such promises are only nominally single. Thus, the
promisor’s choice to pay damages instead of performing is so unlikely to
constitute a violation of a moral obligation that, for evidentiary reasons,
contract law conclusively presumes it is not.
More fundamentally, however, were the law to impose punitive damages for intentional breach, it would be usurping the promisor’s authority
to determine his remedial moral duty at the time he makes his promise.
Moral theories committed to respecting and promoting personal sovereignty must delegate to promisors not only the right to decide whether to
assume a promissory obligation, but also the right to determine what remedial moral duties will attach to it. Although Shiffrin may be correct
that some incidents of breach are conceptual or conventional entailments (such as the promisee’s right of condemnation), there is no inherent requirement that the promisor undertake the remedial moral duty to
pay punitive damages for breach. A promisee who insists that she have
the right to punitive damages for breach can simply reject the offer of a
promise to which a remedial moral duty to pay punitive damages does
not attach. If she accepts the offer, she has no moral grounds for complaining that breach does not entitle her to punitive damages. Thus, by
imposing a mandatory remedial legal duty to pay punitive damages, contract law would undermine, rather than enforce, the promissory responsibilities of morality grounded in respect for personal sovereignty. When it
comes to the legal enforcement of moral obligations, as opposed to
74. Again, Shiffrin is right that forcing a suit in bad faith would be morally wrong even
on the alternative promise view. But, short of violations such as those under Rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts are hardly in a position to determine the
difference between good and bad faith litigation. Further, as I have explained above, it is
doubtful that litigating in good faith violates a moral obligation to keep a promise
intended to be legally enforceable, even when the promisor loses the case. See supra notes
68–69 and accompanying text. Notably, when courts do find litigation to be in bad faith,
monetary sanctions are sometimes awarded. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
32, 35 (1991) (affirming imposition of sanctions for party’s bad faith conduct); Barnes v.
Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (11th Cir. 1998) (affirming award of sanctions by district
court for finding of bad faith). See generally Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal
Law of Litigation Abuse §§ 27–28 (4th ed. 2008) (discussing bad faith as prerequisite for
imposition of sanctions and reviewing types of sanctions). Similarly, if a promisor refuses
to pay a judgment, the law of judicial contempt imposes seriously condemnatory penalties,
including jail time. See, e.g., Am. Oil Co. v. Suhonen, 248 N.W.2d 702, 702 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1976) (approving court order threatening jail time for noncompliance); State ex rel.
Daly v. Snyder, 72 P.3d 780, 783 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (“We hold that the court’s authority
to use contempt proceedings against recalcitrant child support obligors . . . includes
incarceration.”). When courts believe promisors are intentionally flouting their moral and
legal obligations, they do not hesitate to impose sanctions that unequivocally express
disapproval. But as I argue below, such sanctions may conflict with, rather than conform
to, the moral norms governing promise. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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moral duties, the law is not free to use legal remedies as it pleases to
express its moral disapproval. Nor does its failure to do so indicate its
moral indifference or approval. Instead, it represents the law’s respect
for the reasoning that explains and structures the category of moral obligation itself.
B. Liquidated Damages
The liquidated damages doctrine allows promisors to specify damages for breach only if expectation damages are likely to be difficult to
prove and the damages they specify constitute a reasonable approximation of expectation damages. Liquidated damages clearly in excess of expectation damages are deemed void as a penalty.75 Surprisingly, Shiffrin
is reluctant to conclude that this doctrine diverges from the moral requirements of promise. Her principal concern is that it cuts off a selfhelp alternative for parties who want to ensure that breach is punished by
an award of punitive damages, notwithstanding contract law’s refusal to
award them as a matter of course: “Not only are punitive damages unavailable as a response to garden-variety, intentional breach, but willing
parties are not permitted to elect them in advance through legally enforceable agreements.”76 Her hesitancy stems from her view that moral
agents cannot control the degree of severity of their moral wrongs. Thus,
the liquidated damages doctrine might be understood as preserving correspondence with morality by denying promisors the right to attach legal
consequences to a breach that exceeds its (independent) moral seriousness. Shiffrin’s analysis of liquidated damages, however, again fails to distinguish both between promises that are genuinely single promises and
those that are only nominally denominated as single promises but are
really alternative promises, and also between promissory obligations and
the remedial moral rights that attach to them.
Shiffrin’s reluctance to conclude that the liquidated damages doctrine diverges from the morality of promise is surprising because liquidated damage clauses can easily be conceived of as alternative promises.
Indeed, a substantial body of case law struggles to delineate a principled
distinction between the two.77 Given the liquidated damages doctrine,
75. The U.C.C. describes the prohibition as follows:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing
unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2003).
76. Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 726.
77. Compare ADP-Fin. Computer Servs. v. First Nat’l Bank, 703 F.2d 1261, 1264 (11th
Cir. 1983) (finding it was not parties’ intent to treat “monthly minimum charge” clause as
“liquidated damages provision” but simply as “the price to be paid for ADP’s services”), and
In re Cmty. Med. Ctr., 623 F.2d 864, 867 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding “only reasonable
interpretation” of “minimum payment provision” was as “alternative contract” rather than
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courts may not enforce supracompensatory damages clauses. But if the
damage payment is instead construed as an alternative promise, courts
must respect the right of the promisor to choose among the alternatives
provided in his agreement. Thus, the same term often can be construed
as an impermissible penalty or a permissible alternative performance.
Construed as providing for an alternative performance, the ban on
supracompensatory liquidated damages is certainly inconsistent with the
moral theory of promising. There is no (autonomy-based) moral ground
for denying the promisor the power to undertake an alternative, rather
than single, promissory obligation. But the same logic applies even if the
term is construed instead as a “supracompensatory” damage term. The
promisor is, as I have argued, free to choose the remedial moral duty he
wishes to attach to his promissory obligation. Because it refuses to give
legal effect to the promisor’s chosen remedial moral duty, the liquidated
damages doctrine cannot be understood to be grounding its remedial
legal duties for breach on the promisor’s corresponding remedial moral
duty.
Moreover, so viewed, it is misleading to characterize such a damage
term as “supracompensatory.” It is supracompensatory only relative to
the default rule of expectation damages for breach. But it also is a duty
that the promisor agreed to undertake, and one for which any (rational)
promisor would charge the promisee in the form of a price premium at
the time of their agreement. It is therefore difficult to justify its characterization as a remedial moral duty. In reality, the parties that agree to
liquidated damages clauses—especially ones that exceed expectation
damages—likely intend payment of liquidated damages to be a morally
permissible alternative to performance of the promised act.78
C. Mitigation
The mitigation doctrine allows promisors to avoid compensating any
losses the promisee reasonably could have avoided following breach. For
contracts over goods and services sold in a competitive market, the mitigation doctrine effectively requires the promisee to enter into a cover
liquidated damages clause), with Allen v. Smith, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 898, 903–04 (Ct. App.
2002) (finding that “[i]n the absence of a reasonable relationship between the liquidated
damages and the actual damages the parties could have contemplated for breach,” such
clause constitutes impermissible penalty); see also Chandler v. Doran Co., 267 P.2d 907,
910 (Wash. 1954) (“The difficulty lies in determining whether or not the contract pleaded
contains a true alternative promise.”); Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 356 cmt. c
(1981) (stating that parties may create alternative performances in good faith but that
courts “will look to the substance of the agreement to determine whether” provision is
permissible alternative promise or impermissible penalty provision); 2 Samuel Williston,
The Law of Contracts § 781, at 1488–90 (1st ed. 1920) (providing intent-based test to
distinguish alternative promises from liquidated damages).
78. As I noted above, however, morality certainly permits the parties to make the
failure to perform the promised act a breach, which remains morally wrong even after the
promisor pays the liquidated damages.
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transaction to obtain the goods or services elsewhere following notice of
the promisor’s breach. A failure to cover in a timely manner would bar
the promisee from recovering any losses she incurred as a result—for example, any increase in the market price between the time when she
should have covered and the time she actually covered. Shiffrin argues:
Following the norms of promising, promisors would not readily
expect the promisee to accept a substitute for the promised performance, at least not without a strong excuse or justification for
nonperformance. Were a substitute unavoidable or justified,
promissory norms would ordinarily place the burden on the
promisor, rather than promisee, to locate and provide it. It may
sometimes be permissible for the promisor to ask the promisee
to shoulder this burden when the substitute is much easier for
the promisee to obtain or when the promisor is ill-suited to select a replacement . . . . [I]t would usually be unacceptable for
the promisor to insist were the promisee to refuse.
. . . It is morally distasteful to expect the promisee to do
work that could be done by the promisor when the occasion for
the work is the promisor’s own wrongdoing. That expectation is
especially distasteful when its rationale is that it makes the promisor’s wrongdoing easier, simpler, more convenient, or less
costly.79
The moral grounds for Shiffrin’s complaint against the mitigation
doctrine, however, evaporates once the so-called duty to mitigate80 is construed as a component either of the promissory obligation or of the remedial moral duty attached to the promissory obligation. Construed as a
component of the promissory obligation, the duty to mitigate simply indexes the compensatory alternative performance to the value of expectation damages less avoidable losses. By paying that sum to the promisee,
the promisor discharges his moral obligation. Construed as a component
of the remedial moral duty, the duty to mitigate simply specifies part of
the formula the promisor used in calculating the specific content of the
remedial moral duty he chose to assume.81
79. Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 724–25.
80. Technically, the promisee is not subject to a duty to mitigate. Rather, the
promisor can raise failure to mitigate as a defense against an action to recover
compensation for losses the promisee reasonably could have avoided. See Farnsworth,
supra note 5, § 12.12, at 231 (claiming it is “misleading” to say that “the injured party is
under a ‘duty’ to . . . mitigate damages” because “the injured party incurs no liability to the
party in breach by failing to take such steps [but] is simply precluded from recovering
damages for loss [sic] that it could have avoided” (citation omitted)). I will nonetheless
follow common practice and refer loosely to the avoidable loss doctrine and “the duty to
mitigate.”
81. Again, however, the duty to mitigate does not actually require the promisee to
mitigate, as Shiffrin’s critique implies (only a promise from the promisee can impose a
moral obligation on the promisee), but instead provides her with an incentive to mitigate
by denying her right to compensation for losses incurred because of her failure to mitigate.
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Again, a personal sovereignty account of promissory morality provides no grounds for denying the promisor the power to so limit his remedial moral duty. But to subject their compensatory moral duty to the
avoidable loss doctrine, promisors need not express an intention to do so.
Instead, the mitigation doctrine can be justified as a majoritarian default
rule for specifying the content of the remedial moral duties promisors
assume in the absence of their indication otherwise. If the promisor and
promisee intend the promisor to be morally liable to pay expectation
damages for the promisor’s failure to perform a single promise—as the
expectation default remedy presumes—it behooves both the promisor
and promisee to subject the promisee’s remedial moral rights to the
avoidable loss doctrine. From the parties’ perspective at the time of their
agreement—that is, from their ex ante perspective—they minimize the expected joint costs and maximize the expected joint gains from their
agreement by agreeing that the promisee will be unable to recover avoidable losses. This remains true even if the parties do not intend payment
of damages to constitute performance of the promissory moral obligation
or the legal duty to which it corresponds.
The mitigation doctrine is therefore justified as an ordinary
majoritarian default rule that imputes terms into parties’ promises that
they likely did want, but failed to express, or would want had they considered it. It reduces the costs and increases the benefits of promising, while
maximizing the probability that the objective promissory obligations to
which promisors are held correspond with their subjective promissory intentions. At bottom, Shiffrin’s objection rests on the view that the mitigation doctrine derives from an alien normative source outside of the realm
of promissory morality. But its justification is easily provided from within
the norms of promising. From the ex ante perspective—which is the only
perspective that matters for a moral theory of promising derived from the
personal sovereignty conception of autonomy—the doctrine vindicates,
rather than undermines, promissory obligations.
D. Foreseeability
This same response also answers Shiffrin’s objection to the foreseeability limitation on the recovery of consequential damages.82 Properly
understood, that doctrine constitutes a default rule imputing a term into
82. Shiffrin states:
[U]nder the Hadley rule, promisors are liable only for those consequential
damages that could reasonably have been foreseen at the time of the contract’s
formation. From a moral perspective, this is quite strange. If one is bound to
perform but without excuse voluntarily elects to breach one’s duty, a case could
be made that the promisor should be liable for all consequential damages. If
foreseeability should limit this liability at all, what would matter morally is what
was foreseeable at the time of breach rather than at the time of formation.
Whereas the former reflects the idea that breach is a wrong for which the
promisor must take responsibility, the latter fits better with the idea that the
contract merely sets a price for potential promissory breach.
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promises—absent the promisor indicating an intention not to include
it—that increases the expected value of their contract at the time of their
agreement. The foreseeability limitation is subject to an ongoing debate
among economic analysts of law, in which some argue it constitutes an
efficient majoritarian default and others claim it constitutes an efficient
countermajoritarian penalty default rule (which forces efficient information disclosure). In either case, if the foreseeability limitation is an economically efficient default rule, it is justified on the ground that it provides parties with the contract terms they are most likely to prefer. By
excluding recovery for unforeseeable damages, promissory morality vindicates personal sovereignty by maximizing the probability that the parties’
remedial moral rights and duties will align with their subjective intent. In
the event that they form no subjective intent concerning unforeseeable
damages, it maximizes the expected joint value of their promise. A promissory morality that refuses to impute majoritarian terms into promises, or
to subject the process of determining the content of promises to a
majoritarian default regime, perversely undermines the likely subjective
intent of promisors and the purposes they intend their promises to serve.
E. Consideration (and Promissory Estoppel)
Finally, Shiffrin argues that contract law diverges from promissory
morality because the doctrine of consideration prevents it from enforcing
some morally binding promissory obligations.83 Because the doctrine of
promissory estoppel also prevents some promises from being legally enforceable, she would presumably object to it as well.84 I argued above
that an autonomy-based, deontic moral theory, such as the personal sovereignty account, would be incompatible with a legal regime that enforced promises made with the intent not to be legally bound. A correspondence account of contract, then, would adopt doctrines that impose
legal liability only for those promises. If the enforcement doctrines are
effective means of ensuring that all of these promises—and only these
promises—are legally enforced, then they would be not only consistent
The law thereby fails to use its distinctive powers and modes of expression to
mark the judgment that breach is impermissible as opposed to merely subject to a
price.
Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 724 (citations omitted).
83. Shiffrin, Divergence, supra note 3, at 728, 736–37. The Restatement defines
consideration as “a performance or a return promise” that is “bargained for.” Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 71(1) (1981). It further provides that a “performance or return
promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is
given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.” Id. § 71(2).
84. As the Restatement explains:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as
justice requires.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 90(1).
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with but required by the moral theory underlying promissory obligation.
In fact, both deontic moral theorists and economic analysts have persuasively argued that contract law’s enforcement doctrines can be explained
and justified on the ground that they refuse to enforce the kinds of
promises that most promisors would not intend to be legally
enforceable.85
On this view, the enforcement doctrines vindicate, rather than vitiate, promissory morality. They are consistent with the requirements of a
correspondence account of contract because they ensure that every legally enforceable promise corresponds to a promissory obligation that
can justifiably be given legal effect. While the doctrines indeed prevent
contract law from enforcing promissory obligations undertaken with the
intent not to incur legal liability, the refusal to impose a legal duty corresponding to these moral obligations is in fact required by, not inconsistent with, the personal sovereignty conception of autonomy that underwrites promissory obligation. The divergence for which the
consideration and promissory estoppel doctrines are responsible, therefore, is morally commendable. These doctrines create morally objectionable divergence only when they operate to prevent the legal enforcement
of gratuitous promises intended to be given legal effect. If a promisor
makes a morally binding promise that he intends to be given legal effect,
a strong correspondence account of contract has no grounds for refusing
to enforce it.
CONCLUSION
Correspondence accounts insist that the moral and political justification of a body of law cannot be determined without first assessing the
extent to which the legal rights and duties it recognizes correspond to
rights and responsibilities in the moral domain. Whether particular legal
rights and duties in fact enforce corresponding moral rights and responsibilities, and whether such correspondence is consistent with the moral
and political justification of the law, however, cannot be determined without first identifying the normative foundation of the moral rights and
responsibilities in question. Correspondence accounts of contract law,
therefore, cannot proceed even to assess the correspondence of contract
and promise—let alone to approve or object to any alleged correspondence or divergence—without first specifying a theory of promissory mo85. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott & Jody S. Kraus, Contract Law and Theory 172–75 (4th
ed. 2007) (arguing consideration and promissory estoppel doctrines provide “a good proxy
for determining whether the promisee could have reasonably believed that the promisor
intended his promise to be legally binding”); Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 319 (1986) (describing “consent theory” as one where
“[c]ontractual enforcement . . . will usually reflect the will of the parties”); see also Charles
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises, 89 Yale L.J. 1261, 1301–09 (1980) (arguing
that nonreciprocal promises should not be legally enforced unless they are made in a
reciprocal context in which parties would benefit from legal enforcement).
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rality. That theory must explain not only why morality recognizes the
individual capacity to make promises and the obligation to keep them,
but also how morality determines their content.
To illustrate, I have outlined a personal sovereignty theory of the
foundation of promissory morality and argued that it largely reconciles
contract and promise. It explains why contract law’s failure to enforce
some promises is consistent with the demands of promissory morality,
and why most of the doctrines alleged to diverge from promissory morality in fact correspond to it. I have argued that the doctrines of consideration and promissory estoppel serve to prevent legal enforcement of
promises likely intended not to be legally enforceable—a policy that ensures respect for the very intent promissory morality serves to vindicate.
Rather than holding individuals morally accountable for promises they
did not make, the objective theory of intent in fact enforces promissory
obligations. In order to respect the positive liberty of individuals to undertake objectively binding promises—the only kind that can serve most
of the practical purposes for which promises are made—promissory morality itself imposes promissory obligations even on individuals who make
objective promises that they do not subjectively intend to make. Contract
law therefore enforces corresponding moral obligations even when it
holds individuals legally liable for their merely objective promises.
Finally, on the personal sovereignty account of promissory morality,
many of contract law’s remedial default rules can be understood as enforcing the corresponding remedial moral rights and duties to which
breach of promise gives rise. In particular, the expectation damages doctrine—the prime doctrinal target of the moral critiques of contract law—
can be understood as enforcing the remedial moral rights and duties that
most promisors do or would intend to attach to their promissory obligations. On the personal sovereignty account of promissory morality, individuals have the power to determine not only the content of their promissory obligations, but also the content of the remedial moral duties to
which breach of those obligations gives rise. Similarly, many of contract
law’s collateral remedial doctrines, such as the mitigation doctrine, the
rejection of mandatory punitive damages for intentional breach, and the
foreseeability doctrine, should be viewed as enforcing, rather than undermining, the rights and responsibilities of promissory morality. On the
personal sovereignty account, these doctrines are justified as majoritarian
default rules. Because they interpret promises according to the content
most individuals do or would want, majoritarian default rules respect personal sovereignty—by maximizing the likely convergence between individuals’ promissory obligation and their subjective intent—and by increasing the benefits and reducing the costs of exercising the positive
individual liberty to undertake self-imposed moral obligations.
Correspondence accounts of contract law rightly inquire into the relationship between contractual and promissory rights and responsibilities
in order to assess contract law’s moral and political justification. But the
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correspondence inquiry, in the final analysis, requires moral theory to
precede legal theory: The relationship between contract and promise
cannot be determined and evaluated without first engaging in the moral
theorizing necessary to understand the structure and content of promissory morality. Although I have not defended a normative foundation for
promissory morality, the personal sovereignty account I have sketched illustrates how moral theory matters in determining the structure and content of the promissory rights and responsibilities to which contract law
might correspond. Correspondence theorists of contract law, then, can
proceed either by accepting and defending the personal sovereignty account or offering an alternative theory of promissory morality. Either
way, the conclusions correspondence theorists reach will be necessarily
dependent on that account.

